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F R O M  T H E  E D I T O R
T
his issue of Hemisphere went to press just weeks before the US presidential elections. As the 
campaign reached its high point and the candidates debated their positions on foreign poli­
cy and domestic issues, we heard very little about Latin America. At most, the region 
received only passing notice in the context of national security, with concern over the possi­
bility of terrorists entering this country via the Mexican border.
This situation is very different from the one we saw four years ago. In the 2000 campaign, President Bush 
staked his claim to foreign policy expertise on his familiarity with Mexico as governor of Texas. Here at 
Florida International University, we remember his visit to our campus in the summer of 2000, when he 
pledged to make Latin America the centerpiece of his administration’s international relations.
For a short time, it looked like that might really happen. At the April 2001 Summit of the Americas in 
Quebec City, Canada, President Bush was a strong advocate of the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA). And many people on both sides of the US-Mexican border felt a surge of hope at the sight of him 
shaking hands with Vicente Fox over a proposed immigration accord in September of that same year. But 
just days after their meeting, the September 11 terrorist attacks completely changed the nations focus.
Three years later, with attention still concentrated on national security and Iraq, immigration has moved far 
down on the list of political priorities and the FTAA talks have stalled.
In this issue of Hemisphere, we have chosen to examine the current state of some of the most important 
themes in US-Latin American relations: trade and economic ties (including remittances); immigration and 
labor; democratization; and, of course, security policy, including terrorism, illegal narcotics and, especially, 
border issues. Likewise, because of the overwhelming importance of the US relationship with Mexico, our 
book review focuses on this topic.
I would like to extend a special thanks to our contributors, especially Marfa Teresa Romero and Patricio 
Crooker, who wrote special reports for us on the important referendum processes in Venezuela and Bolivia 
this summer and their consequences for those countries, the wider Latin American region and relations with 
the United States.
We also feature a special essay by Tony Maingot, Hemisphere’s founding editor, who retired from the facul­
ty of Florida International University this year. He has gone back to the very first piece he wrote for this 
magazine 16 years ago and updated his survey of the main trends in Caribbean politics and economics.
We are proud to have compiled such an extensive archive of commentary and analysis over the past decade 
and a half and we are enthusiastic about continuing that tradition as new leaders come to power and region­
al events unfold. Here in our editorial offices we are already looking ahead to our next issue, which will 
focus on Brazil. As always, we have a wealth of material to work with.
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R E P O R T S  
The Caribbean, 15 Years Later
by Anthony P. Maingot
Caribbean economies dependent on traditional exports such as sugar, bananas 
and minerals are at the mercy o f  “fr e e  trade” dom inated by US and European 
agricultural subsidies.
n the inaugural issue of 
Hemisphere (fall 1988), I 
described the Caribbean as a 
region of “sovereign but 
balkanized and fragile states.”
I argued that the region might be 
reaching the limit of its privileged 
economic arrangements with both 
Europe and the United States. The 
situation as I write 15 years later is 
even more alarming than I had 
anticipated: The independent states 
which compose the region’s premier 
economic arrangement, CARI- 
COM, are in danger of being mar­
ginalized not only globally but 
indeed in their own backyard.
Both economic and political factors 
explain this worrisome trend.
From the economic point of 
view, the erosion of the privileged 
protocols which the CARICOM 
countries enjoyed has been dramat­
ic. Gone are the CBI, the use of 
“936” funds from Puerto Rico’s dis­
mantled arrangement with the US 
Treasury, and the aid and non­
reciprocal arrangements of the vari­
ous Lome conventions. SELA— 
the Latin American Economic 
System—has turned out to be a 
paper tiger and whatever advantages 
are derived from the much-touted 
Association of Caribbean States, 
economic benefits are not among 
them. Replacing all these arduous­
ly negotiated agreements is the 
Cotonou Agreement, composed of 
a series of Economic Partnership 
Agreements which emphasize “free 
trade” rather than aid and one-way 
non-reciprocal trade. I put free 
trade in quotes because even as the 
doctrine of free trade is being foist­
ed on small economies, large
economies make a mockery of the 
principle by continuing the heavy 
subsidy of their agricultural com­
modities. As such, the inability of 
the regional economies to break 
their dependence on traditional 
exports (bananas, sugar, minerals) 
and to dismantle the “infant indus­
try” provisions which make so 
much of their manufacturing 
uncompetitive converts the empha­
sis on free trade into a perilous 
affair. Beyond those issues which 
are hardly susceptible to immediate 
and effective decision-making, 
other structural realities have little 
or nothing to do with political will. 
The long and short of it is that size 
does matter. Start with population 
(read, labor force and markets): In 
a future Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, CARICOM (including
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the eight million Haitians) will rep­
resent 1.74% of that 800 million- 
person market. The total GDP of 
CARICOM is a mere 0.23% of the 
US GDP and the openness of the 
Caribbean economies continues 
much as before all the talk of “com­
mon markets.” Intra-CARICOM 
trade is still only 15% of its total, 
and fully 89% of that is represented 
by petrochemical exports from 
Trinidad and Tobago.
All these structural realities ought 
to give pause to any residual beliefs 
that there is still negotiating 
mileage to be had from playing the 
Third World card. The painful 
drama of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) ruling on the 
banana issue demonstrated that 
when large US or European compa­
nies join forces with large Latin 
American producers, Caribbean 
Lilliputs get squashed. Now it is 
sugar which will prove bitter pick­
ings. The Caribbean exports 1.6 
million tons, or 3.6%, of the global 
trade in sugar. No matter: When 
Brazil, Australia and Thailand went 
after Europe’s subsidies of its mas­
sive beet sugar industry, Caribbean 
entreaties that their minute sugar 
protocols be excluded (as “third 
party rights”) from any WTO deci­
sion fell on deaf “Third World” 
ears. The rules of the game took 
no account of size. Even the nor­
mally staid Financial Times (August 
6, 2004) weighed in with the blan­
ket judgment that the WTO had 
struck “a blow for justice and good 
sense.” The Caribbean response 
was immediate. The Jamaicans 
lamented that the “solemn commit­
ments” and “sanctity” of the 
Cotonou protocol had been violat­
ed {Jamaica Observer, August 9, 
2004), the Guyanese declared that 
the WTO decision “clearly shows 
the ruthlessness of world trade”
(.Stabroek News, August 9, 2004), 
and the Barbadians decried the
“tunnel vision” of the WTO. All, 
of course, to no avail. When it 
comes to opposing “free trade,” 
small economies are spitting into 
the wind.
But if a sort of economic law of 
necessity shields Caribbean elites 
from taking all the blame for the 
vagaries of world trade, the same 
cannot be said about regional 
geopolitics. If there are limits to 
the sovereign actions of small states, 
there are also constraints on the 
hegemonic inclinations of major 
ones, even in their historical spheres 
of influence. This is especially the 
case in the post-Cold War era and 
it also explains why some of the 
recent CARICOM geopolitical pos­
turing harbors serious risks. I am 
not referring to the CARICOM 
states’ principled stand on trade 
and relations with Cuba; that 
stance is shared in some way by all 
except the perpetually short-sighted 
(when it comes to Cuba) US. I am 
referring to the obdurate support 
for President Jean Bertrand Aristide 
of Haiti, as misguided a stance as 
we have ever seen coming from the 
generally agile and wily diplomacy 
of the islands. Two explanations 
appear plausible. First, since Haiti 
is a full member of CARICOM, 
the organization logically felt that it 
had a duty to stand by a democratic 
partner especially when, and here 
the second reason kicks in, the 
removal of Aristide was seen as a 
blatant act of US imperial arro­
gance. The problem is that neither 
argument is watertight. Aristide 
was governing in full defiance of 
Haitian constitutional mandates, 
and the decision not to send troops 
to keep him in power (the only way 
to avoid his defenestration) was as 
much a French project as it was 
American. The CARICOM diplo­
matic pirouettes did nothing to 
save Aristide and certainly have 
done nothing to enhance the com­
munity’s prestige. To the extent 
that there is peacekeeping and 
nation-building taking place in 
Haiti, it is a Latin American, not 
Caribbean, project. The decisive 
actions of Brazil and its Mercosur 
allies represent a clear geopolitical 
watershed in the area and have for 
all practical purposes sidelined 
Haiti’s Caribbean neighbors. It is a 
telling point that the recent unani­
mous vote of the 19-member Rio 
Pact to sustain a “long-term” peace 
mission in Haiti included the 
assenting vote of Guyana, which 
presently holds the rotating 
Caribbean seat in the Pact. This is 
the same Guyana that in CARI­
COM forums was adamantly—and 
quite vocally—in favor of the 
restoration of Aristide.
The conclusion has to be that 
while small states might well be 
powerless to withstand the econom­
ic pressures of a globalized world, 
the same does not hold for geopo­
litical decisions. The latter field 
allows for political adroitness and 
diplomatic finesse to increase “sym­
bolic” or “soft” power. Past leaders 
of the Caribbean had substantial 
reserves of those qualities. It is too 
bad that the present leadership is 
presiding over the erosion of that 
magnificent legacy.
Fifteen years after the first 
Hemisphere editorial, the region 
appears more balkanized and feeble 
than ever. ■
Anthony P. M aingot is Hemisphere’s 
found in g editor and Professor 
Emeritus o f  Sociology at Florida 
International University. Most 
recently, he is the co-author, with 
Wilfredo Lozano, o f  “The United 
States and the Caribbean: 
Transforming Hegemony and  
Sovereignty” (New York: Routledge, 
forthcom ing).
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Reports: Venezuela
Venezuela after the Referendum
by M aria Teresa Romero
US policy toward Chavez is 
unlikely to changeObservers are debating the course US for­eign policy will take toward Venezuela after the August 15 
referendum, which reaffirmed the 
mandate of President Hugo 
Chavez. Teams from the 
Organization of American States 
(OAS) and the Carter Center 
endorsed the official results, which 
showed approximately 59% of par­
ticipants voting “no” to the opposi­
tion’s attempt to recall Chavez from 
power. In the past two years, 
despite important commercial (oil) 
ties, the more than four-decades- 
long “special” relationship between 
the US and Venezuela has degener­
ated into a climate of tension and 
confrontation. At first glance, it 
seems possible that the consolida­
tion and relegitimation of the cur­
rent Venezuelan government could 
lead to a more moderate and 
friendly mutual foreign policy and a 
normalization of bilateral relations. 
This trend could be reversed at any 
moment, however, depending on 
the policies of the Chavez govern­
ment not only toward the United 
States, but toward the rest of the 
hemisphere and Venezuelan society 
itself. The US continues to distrust 
Chavez; Washington may have 
accepted, and formally legitimated, 
Chavez’s government, but it has not 
embraced his domestic and interna­
tional revolutionary pretensions.
Republicans and Democrats alike 
await the next steps of the 
Venezuelan government. Both par­
ties are familiar with Chavez’s 
unpredictable behavior, his brand of 
military populism, his strong leftist
leanings and authoritarian tenden­
cies. The question is whether he 
will use his referendum victory to 
intensify his policies of political 
repression and domestic confronta­
tion, institutional dismantling and 
human rights violations. Chavez’s 
friendship with Fidel Castro and 
other Latin American radical 
groups is well known; after the 
August vote, he was congratulated 
by Colombia’s FARC and ELN 
guerrillas, as well as a new 
Venezuelan guerrilla group, the 
Bolivarian Liberation Front (FBL, 
in Spanish). Leaders from both 
major US parties worry that Chavez 
could become Castro’s right-hand 
man in South America, aggravating 
tensions with the US and fueling 
conflicts in neighboring countries.
A Polarized Society
Immediately after the referen­
dum, Chavez promised to safeguard 
Venezuela’s foreign economic and 
political ties, especially with the 
United States. His foreign minister, 
Jesus A. Perez, reiterated Venezuela’s 
desire for friendly international 
relations. Before long, however, 
Chavez was back to his habitual 
anti-imperialist rhetoric. Albeit in 
a more moderate tone than the one 
he adopted for the referendum 
campaign, he inveighed against the 
Bush administration, its policy 
toward Latin America and the 
model of liberal democracy that,
according to Chavez, the US “is 
trying to impose on the rest of the 
world.”
The behavior of the Venezuelan 
government before and during the 
referendum process and the opposi­
tion charges of fraud and irregulari­
ties raised considerable concern in 
the US government, civil society 
and the press. In fact, the Bush 
administration delayed its official 
reaction to the referendum until 
Venezuela’s National Electoral 
Council (CNE) completed an audit 
of the results and the OAS and 
Carter Center presented their 
reports. The US accepted the out­
come, but it vehemently opposed 
voting on the draft resolution 
before the Permanent Council of 
the OAS, which urged “all actors to 
accept and respect the results of the 
referendum.”
Whether or not the opposition’s 
cries of fraud are ever substantiated 
in a way that satisfies the interna­
tional community, the United 
States knows—and the OAS 
Secretary General, Cesar Gaviria, 
acknowledged before that organiza­
tion’s Permanent Council—that 
numerous problems occurred before 
and during the referendum process. 
These included abuse of power, 
manipulation, delay tactics, intimi­
dation, attempts at censorship and 
blatant irregularities (illegal migra­
tion of voters and failure to consult 
voting lists, elimination of numer-
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ous voters from the voting registry, 
addition of 230,000 new voters 
without clear documentation in the 
two months preceding the referen­
dum, registration of more than 1.5 
million foreigners, exclusion of
18,000 non-Chavistas, etc.), as well 
as the underlying problem of gov­
ernment control of the CNE, as 
various independent reports and 
international figures invited to 
observe the proceedings noted. 
Indeed, a report by Harvard 
University and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology concluded 
that the likelihood of fraud in the 
referendum was 99%.
During the voting Venezuelans 
also had to endure, as never before 
in their democratic history, an 
onslaught of populism and dema- 
goguery. The government openly 
manipulated votes during the cam­
paign, taking advantage of high oil 
prices to step up the pace of pop­
ulist handouts. In the weeks lead­
ing up to the vote, the president 
distributed $1.6 billion in oil 
money to the poor. At the Vatican, 
Venezuelan Cardinal Jose Castillo 
Lara complained that Chavez was 
buying the votes of the country’s 
poorest citizens, paying $50-$60 in 
exchange for a pledge to vote “no” 
to the recall. The Church and 
other sectors of Venezuelan society 
also denounced government spend­
ing on electoral advertising.
The United States is well aware 
that the referendum has done noth­
ing to bridge the great rifts between 
Venezuelans and that in fact, more 
polarization, crisis and division are 
likely. Even if the allegations of 
fraud are never proven, a significant 
percentage of the population 
remains distrustful of the govern­
ment, state institutions and the 
electoral authorities. The referen­
dum, instead of coming closer to
resolving the crisis in Venezuela, 
may have deepened it. Assuming 
that the CNE’s official results are 
accurate, 41% of Venezuelans 
(those who voted yes to the recall) 
firmly oppose the Chavez govern­
ment, and another 30% (those who 
abstained) are indifferent. If 
Chavez does not dramatically 
change course and win over those 
who voted against him or didn’t 
vote at all, there can be no peace— 
social or political—in Venezuela. 
Poverty also remains a persistent 
problem. Despite government 
spending, poverty has not been alle­
viated in Venezuela, but in fact has 
increased. With oil revenues at 
their highest point in history, the 
poverty rate rose from 52% in 1999 
to 72% in the first quarter of 2004.
At the moment, despite the many 
calls for reconciliation and dia­
logue, it is difficult to imagine a 
180-degree shift in the govern­
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ment’s conduct or its policies. In 
his victory speech, Chavez made it 
clear that the vote to keep him in 
power was not only an endorse­
ment of his government and its rev­
olutionary policies, but also of its 
“Bolivarian” ambitions for the 
country and the continent. The 
day after the referendum, govern­
ment supporters attacked opposi­
tion protesters, leaving one dead 
and eight wounded. One week 
later, the government withdrew 
official recognition of the opposi­
tion coalition’s Democratic 
Coordinator, confirmed the sen­
tences of political prisoners, and 
began an aggressive campaign to 
win upcoming state and municipal 
elections. At the same time, the 
government-friendly majority in the 
National Assembly resumed its 
practice of rubber-stamping bills 
that, opposition and civil society 
critics say, infringe on civil liberties, 
especially freedom of expression 
and property rights.
With Chavez legitimated and tri­
umphant, and an opposition that 
has been weakened but remains 
fiercely committed in its hatred of 
him, Venezuela’s future outlook is 
less than heartening. We can 
expect to see radicals from both 
sides—government supporters and 
opponents—dominate the more 
moderate social and political groups 
that defend the democratic system, 
escalating the domestic confronta­
tion. The scenario most people 
would like to see—reconciliation, 
political harmony, a transparent 
and serious democratic process—is, 
unfortunately, the one least likely to 
occur; at least not the way things 
seem at present.
“Venezuela Is Too Important for 
Neglect”
Given these conditions, it is safe 
to predict that Venezuela will con­
tinue to be a source of concern for
the United States in both the short 
and long terms. Whoever wins the 
US presidential elections, George 
W. Bush or John Kerry, he will be 
obliged to keep an eye on 
Venezuela and respond to develop­
ments there. As the Washington 
Post warned after the referendum, 
“Venezuela is too important for 
neglect.”
The new US president cannot 
simply undo the damage to political 
relations and, to a lesser degree, 
trade between the two countries 
over the last few years. Depending 
on Chavez’s actions, the new US 
leader can attempt to rebuild the 
“special” bilateral relation that char­
acterized US-Venezuelan relations 
before Chavez took power, or, con­
versely, take definitive action to dis­
tance the US and perhaps even 
break off diplomatic relations if 
necessary (e.g., if Chavez poses a 
serious threat to US or regional 
security). In late June, less than 
two months before the August 15 
referendum, the US Senate held a 
special hearing on the state of 
democracy in Venezuela.
Republican and Democratic sena­
tors, as well as high-ranking Bush 
administration officials, expressed 
doubts about the possibility of 
holding a fair and transparent refer­
endum process. Senator Bill 
Nelson (D-FL) went so far as to 
warn that “if the government of 
Venezuela continues with these 
positions (attacking the US and 
collaborating with enemy govern­
ments and alleged terrorist groups), 
then we will have no choice but to 
declare the Venezuelan government 
to be hostile and unfriendly to the 
United States.”
Nelson’s words reflect a bipartisan 
consensus on the issue of 
Venezuela. The potential threat the 
Chavez government poses to US 
and hemispheric security, and the 
importance of Venezuela’s oil
resources, have created a remarkable 
similarity of opinion among 
Republicans and Democrats. 
Despite the strategic differences 
that come to the fore during an 
election year, the two parties are 
likely to adopt a common foreign 
policy toward Venezuela in the case 
of a serious crisis. This consensus is 
unlikely to change regardless of the 
outcome of the November elec­
tions.
Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution 
represents a difficult challenge for 
the United States, and it is likely to 
do so for some time. The current 
government in Venezuela has tested 
the commitment of the United 
States—and all the members of the 
OAS—to the principles of democ­
racy. In general, both the US and 
the OAS have responded slowly, 
and weakly, to events in Venezuela, 
due to a combination of economic 
and geostrategic interests and the 
complexities of dealing with an 
authoritarian government that 
poses as a democracy, came to 
power through democratic means 
and, thanks to the referendum, 
enjoys renewed legitimacy. 
Compared to the rest of the inter- 
American community, however, the 
United States has taken a responsi­
ble and consistent approach to the 
abuses and provocations of the 
Chavez regime. ■
Maria Teresa Romero is a professor in 
the Department o f  International 
Affairs at the Universidad Central de 
Venezuela. She writes a regular col­
umn fo r  El Universal newspaper in 
Caracas and is director o f  the politica l 
analysis newsletter Vision Venezolana.
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A Victory for Democracy
by Patricio Crooker
On Sunday, July 18,2004, the people of Bolivia sent an impor­tant message to the nation and the world 
when approximately 60 percent of 
eligible voters went to the polls in 
the country’s first democratic referen­
dum. They were asked to answer yes 
or no to a series of five questions 
concerning whether and how Bolivia 
should export oil and natural gas. 
These questions played an important 
role in the popular protests that 
drove President Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada from power in October 2003 
and have continued to bedevil the 
new administration of Carlos Mesa. 
After a battle to make the referen­
dum happen, the president was 
pleased with the impressive turnout 
and the results, which empower the 
government to exert greater control 
over the nation’s energy resources. 
Despite the efforts of radical leaders 
to organize opposition to the popular 
consult, the National Electoral Court 
brought off the voting in record time 
on a very low budget. From the 
Andean highlands to the nation’s val­
leys and tropical regions, the 
Bolivian people used this opportuni­
ty to support a fragile democracy in a 
peaceful and orderly process.
With its new mandate, the govern­
ment faces another battle, this time 
with oil companies and the Bolivian 
Congress to create a new and just
energy export law. Less than two 
weeks after the referendum,
President Mesa began consultations 
with the Congress to draft new legis­
lation in response to the referendum. 
The government’s prompt actions, in 
conjunction with the well-ordered 
referendum process itself, are intend­
ed to send a positive image of Bolivia 
after more than two years of protests, 
deaths and violence in this poor 
country, which has a wealth of natu­
ral resources.
The October 2003 unrest repre­
sented a call to Bolivia’s political par­
ties to become more representative of 
their constituents and to the govern­
ment to be more transparent and 
open about its policies—especially
President Carlos Mesa led  an intense pub lic relations campaign in fa vo r o f  the yes vote.
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to a series o f  f i v e  questions concerning the country’s o il and natural gas exports.Bolivians were asked to answer yes or no
concerning the export of energy 
reserves, a contentious issue in a 
country with a history of foreign 
exploitation of its natural resources.
In organizing the referendum, the 
Mesa administration faced consider­
able pressure from leftist groups to 
include an option to nationalize the 
nation’s energy sector, but the presi­
dent was adamant in his views that 
nationalization would be disastrous 
for Bolivia. Some radical leaders 
urged the public not to vote and 
threatened to burn ballots and close 
down voting locations.
Unfortunately, the national press 
played an important role in inciting 
these doubts, in some cases inflating 
the threats and views of leaders in 
the movement against the referen­
dum. In the city of El Alto, where 
most of the October 2003 revolts
took place, the days leading up to 
the vote were characterized by uncer­
tainty as to the outcome and the 
potential for more unrest. Even 
there, however, international 
observers and the international press 
were impressed with the semblance 
of order and popular participation. 
Before all the polls had closed, as the 
first results were coming in via the 
media, some radical leaders—sur­
prised by the high level of popular 
participation and the clear victory of 
the yes vote—backpedaled on their 
threats and negative propaganda.
The real winners were those 
Bolivians who participated in the ref­
erendum and believe that democracy 
is the only way to bring change for 
the better.
The unusual case of having a presi­
dent with no party base in Congress
made the referendum a unique but 
dangerous opportunity for Bolivia.
To achieve the consensus to pass his 
projects, Mesa led an intense public 
relations campaign in favor of the yes 
vote that explained the benefits of a 
positive response to the referendum’s 
five questions. His high public 
approval ratings give him an impor­
tant tool to pursue his agenda, while 
the direct form of democracy repre­
sented by the referendum gives 
Bolivia an important opportunity to 
solidify its young and damaged 
democracy. For the first time in 
more than 22 years of democracy, 
Bolivians were asked to participate 
directly in an important policy mak­
ing decision. Although critics com­
plained that some of the five ques­
tions were too long or ambiguous, 
the positive result helped to legit-
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The voting was peacefu l and orderly, even in the highland city o f  El Alto, the site 
o f  most o f  the violence leading up to President Gonzalo Sdnchez de Lozada’s resig­
nation in October 2003.
The results o f  the referendum empow­
er the Mesa governm ent to exercise 
greater control over the nations energy
resources.
imize Mesa’s government. The new 
legislation being drafted will increase 
the taxes and royalties of private 
investors as well as the participation 
of Bolivia’s national oil company, 
YPFB. Investment is very low at the 
moment as private oil investors close­
ly monitor proposed changes to 
Energy Law 1689, passed in 1996 by 
the Sanchez de Lozada administra­
tion.
The popular consult was a victory 
for democracy, helping to unify 
Bolivia and end speculation about a 
division between the country’s west­
ern and highland regions, where 
most of the October 2003 protests 
took place, and the east, where most 
of the oil and gas fields are located. 
The events of last fall forced changes 
in the way politics work in Bolivia. 
The July 2004 referendum is part of 
those changes and raises hopes for a 
more secure future for the country’s 
democratic governance. ■
Patricio Crooker is a photojournalist 
based in Bolivia and a frequent con­
tributor to Hemisphere.
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Politics, Access and History
by James F. Siekmeier
A s a college professor, I once wrapped up a class on modern Latin American history by putting General 
Agusto Pinochet Ugarte of Chile 
on trial for human rights abuses. 
That is, one group of students was 
assigned to prosecute, and another 
to defend, his contentious 1973 to 
1989 regime. The general was con­
victed—revelations of torture 
clinched the prosecution’s case— 
but the battle was a tough, bitter 
one. Pinochet’s defenders argued 
that he saved Chileans from the 
anarchic, atheistic Communism 
that would have resulted if leftist 
Salvador Allende Gossens (1970- 
1973) had remained in power.
This mock debate—not really 
“mock,” since it was mid 1999 and 
Pinochet was under house arrest in 
Great Britain for human rights vio­
lations—allowed the students to 
glimpse the enduring pain and 
powerful legacy of the Pinochet 
regime, a legacy that has cast a long 
shadow on Chilean history and US- 
Chilean relations.
Two months too late for the stu­
dents in my class, in summer 1999, 
the United States released the first 
installment of a large cache of doc­
uments pertaining to US-Chilean 
relations from 1968-1991. This set 
of material, the Chile Declassifica­
tion Project (CDP) of 1998-2000, 
was the result of an inter-agency 
effort during one of the most diffi­
cult periods in the history of rela­
tions between the two countries. 
Because the Pinochet period was 
such a contentious one, many in 
the United States felt that the
release of the information was an 
unstated moral obligation. The 
world needed to know more about 
what happened during the Pinochet 
period; more specifically, about US 
knowledge, support of, or complici­
ty with Pinochet’s actions. In a 
nation that has historically valued 
openness as the first, necessary 
step toward government accounta­
bility, the CDP was, in the words 
of one official who worked on the 
project, an almost “cathartic experi­
ence.”
“I Think You Are Entitled to 
Know What Happened Back 
Then, and How It Happened”
The United States decision to 
declassify the CDP documents 
came after about seven years of 
post-Cold War (relative) calm and 
nine years after the Chilean govern­
ment had made the transition from 
military dictatorship to democracy. 
The catalyst was the startling arrest 
of a notorious leader, but the back­
ground to the decision is impor­
tant.
Starting in 1997, the Spanish 
government, under the terms of a 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, 
requested that the US share any 
information it might have about 
human rights violations under 
Pinochet. A small group of Spanish 
and Chilean officials worked 
behind the scenes to build a case 
against the Chilean general. Their 
efforts culminated dramatically in 
October 1998, when a team of 
Spanish judges arrested Pinochet 
for human rights violations com­
mitted during his tenure as Chilean 
head of state (he had been indicted
two years before). The arrest took 
place in England, where Pinochet 
had traveled for medical treatment. 
The Spanish judges—headed at 
first by Manuel Garcia Castellon 
and later by Baltazar Garzon— 
accused Pinochet of carrying out 
“criminal activities...which [had] as 
their object the physical elimina­
tion, disappearance, or kidnapping 
of thousands of persons, having 
previously been subject to general­
ized torture.”
Once Pinochet was arrested, the 
United States found itself forced to 
take sides. The Spanish had arrest­
ed the former dictator but the 
Chileans wanted to be the ones to 
determine Pinochet’s fate. On the 
one hand, Spain (and other 
nations, along with relatives of US 
citizens who were victims of 
Pinochet’s repression and members 
of the US Congress) wanted to try 
Pinochet in a Spanish tribunal, in 
part to set a precedent for universal 
jurisdiction of repressive leaders. 
The Chilean government, on the 
other hand, was concerned that a 
foreign trial of Pinochet would 
inflame the country’s military.
Because of its covert action to 
undermine the Allende regime and 
support Pinochet, the US govern­
ment found it impossible to ignore 
the issue. Indeed, the US had been 
involved in Chilean affairs since the 
1960s, when US covert assistance 
to Edward Frei Montlava, the 
Christian Democratic presidential 
candidate in 1964, comprised 
about one-half of his campaign 
budget. Some US officials sided 
with the Spanish government and 
its argument that Pinochet’s human
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The Chile Declassification Project o f1998-2000
La Moneda palace in Santiago, Chile on September 11, 1973, duirng the coup d ’etat led by Augusto Pinochet against constitu­
tional President Salvador Allende. Recently released documents shed light on the US role in Chile during and after the coup.
rights abuses had affected Chileans 
and non-Chileans alike, and that 
his arrest was a test case for interna­
tional justice. Many US citizens 
and the international human rights 
community supported the idea of a 
tribunal to bring to light more 
information about Pinochet’s 
human rights abuses. Other US 
officials, however, argued that the 
Chileans had the right to try their 
notorious former general and head 
of state.
In the end, the US sided with the 
Chileans. Underlying this decision
was the fact that one of the corner­
stones of the transition to democra­
cy in South America in the 1980s 
was amnesty for the heads of state 
of former military regimes. Putting 
Pinochet on trial broke a tacit 
agreement (between the former dic­
tators, Latin American society and 
the US government) that crimes 
against humanity committed by 
South American military leaders 
would not be prosecuted. The US 
authorities knew their decision to 
side with the Chileans would be 
controversial. To placate US citi­
zens—including families of the vic­
tims of Pinochet’s repression—and 
the international human rights 
community, they decided to con­
duct a thorough declassification of 
US government documents.
The Clinton administration had 
a history of declassifying docu­
ments in an attempt to come to 
terms with the past. In this case, 
the divulging of historical informa­
tion fit well with another adminis­
tration policy: apologizing for US 
misdeeds in Latin America during 
the Cold War. On a visit to
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The Chile Declassification Project brought to 
light considerable evidence regarding ongoing 
debates in American foreign policy about the 
extent of US responsibility for the 1973 coup 
that brought Pinochet to power, as well as US 
knowledge of his governments subsequent 
human rights abuses.
Central America in 1999, President 
Clinton apologized for US aid to 
repressive military regimes in 
Guatemala from the 1960s through 
the 1980s. A remarkable conflu­
ence of events, therefore, propelled 
the Chile Declassification Project: 
the end of the Cold War in the 
early 1990s; the Clinton adminis­
tration’s penchant for openness and 
apologies for US Cold War policies 
that contributed to the deaths of 
innocent people; the behind-the- 
scenes work of the human rights 
community and other advocates for 
openness and their allies in the US 
Congress; and—the catalyst—the 
remarkable arrest of Pinochet at the 
behest of a group of Spanish 
judges. President Clinton succinct­
ly summed up the goal of the 
CDP: “I think you are entitled to 
know what happened back then, 
and how it happened.”
A Policy of Openness
The Chile Declassification 
Project represented one of the 
largest inter-agency declassifications 
of foreign policy documents in the 
history of this country. 
Approximately 23,000 documents 
were declassified. The project was 
directed by a National Security 
Council directive, or “tasker.” 
According to Peter Kornbluh, the 
author of a book on the project, the 
point of the CDP was “to insist in 
encouraging a consensus in Chile 
on reinvigorating its truth and rec­
onciliation process to address such 
questions as the fate of the disap­
peared.” The declassification 
included three separate installments 
of documents from the Department 
of State, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the National Security 
Council, the Department of 
Defense, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Department of 
Justice, and the National Archives 
and Records Administration,
including the presidential libraries 
of Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan. 
The first installment contained 
approximately 5,800 documents 
from 1973 to 1978; the second, 
about 1,100 documents from 1968 
through 1973; and the third and 
last, approximately 16,000 docu­
ments covering the period from 
1968 to 1991. The remarkable 
thing about the project is that its 
scope was expanded to include not 
only Pinochet-era documents, but 
also materials from before and even 
after the general’s rule. (The docu­
ments, released in 1999-2000, are 
on the State Department’s website, 
www.state.gov, under Freedom of 
Information Act [FOIA], 
Declassified Documents 
Collections.)
Despite its path-breaking nature, 
it is important to realize that the 
CDP is not the only inter-agency 
declassification project the US gov­
ernment has conducted. Indeed, it 
can only be understood in the con­
text of other document release proj­
ects. These have concerned indi­
vidual countries, among them 
Guatemala, El Salvador and 
Argentina, as well as such wide- 
ranging topics as Nazi expropria­
tions of Jewish assets during World 
War II and the John F. Kennedy 
assassination.
The CDP came into existence in 
part because of a new trend toward
openness in the federal govern­
ment. The Clinton administration 
codified this policy of openness 
with Executive Order 12958, 
signed by the president on April 
17, 1995. It shifted the burden of 
proof regarding the secrecy of docu­
ments from the parties requesting 
access to those who produced the 
documents. Previously, federal gov­
ernment agencies could keep a doc­
ument classified simply by asserting 
that its release would hurt US 
national security interests. E.O. 
12958 required the agency that 
produced a specific document to 
explain why keeping it classified 
was important to the nation’s secu­
rity.
The Chilean project proved to be 
unprecedented in many respects. 
Despite some understandable dis­
putes between agencies, the inter­
agency process (coordinated by the 
National Security Council) by 
which the documents were pro­
duced proved to be a model for 
inter-agency cooperation. The 
most high-profile dispute occurred 
when the CIA changed its mind 
about releasing some sensitive doc­
uments, and then changed it back.
The CIA released a large number 
of documents not only on 
Pinochet’s human rights violations, 
but also on US covert action in 
Chile. The methodology of the 
CIA’s review changed over time. At
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first, the document search and 
declassification at the agency was 
rather narrow, limited to CIA 
knowledge of Pinochet’s human 
rights abuses. Finding such docu­
ments proved difficult, as the 
agency’s files were organized by 
operation or asset, not categories 
such as “human rights.” The broad 
language of the NSC tasker, howev­
er, meant that the CIA could not 
simply throw up its hands and 
declare defeat. Since the tasker 
called for the release of information 
that had to do with “political vio­
lence,” the search was necessarily 
wide and deep. CIA officials 
favored a narrow definition of 
“political violence” that excluded 
coups d’etat, but they lost that 
argument. In the end, according to 
one CIA officer who worked on the 
CDP and who did not want to be 
identified, virtually all covert action 
was defined as a form of political 
violence. According to this inter­
pretation, the NSC tasker could 
require that the CIA release docu­
ments on US covert action in Chile 
that were unrelated to CIA knowl­
edge of Pinochet’s human rights 
abuses.
Raising New Questions
“It’s not a part of American histo­
ry we are proud of,” concluded 
Secretary of State Colin Powell in 
February 2003, referring to US 
covert action in Chile in the early 
1970s. Although not an official 
apology like the ones issued by the 
Clinton administration, the secre­
tary’s comment is in that vein. The 
anti-Allende activities of the US 
government, and Washington’s sup­
port of the Pinochet regime, reflect­
ed disturbing tendencies in US for­
eign policy—a crusading zeal to 
change another nation’s policies to 
more closely resonate with US val­
ues; interference in the electoral 
politics of an established democra­
cy; and a virulent fear of left-wing 
or radical change in a society where 
the distribution of wealth had been 
skewed towards the very wealthy 
for centuries. But the CDP reveals 
equally deep, but more positive 
trends in US society: the idea that 
openness can lead to greater under­
standing, even learning from histo­
ry, and that coming to terms with 
the past can bring healthy reflection 
on past excesses.
The CDP brought to light con­
siderable evidence regarding ongo­
ing debates in American foreign 
policy about the extent of US 
responsibility for the 1973 coup 
that brought Pinochet to power, as 
well as US knowledge of his gov­
ernment’s subsequent human rights 
abuses. Academics and politicians 
will no doubt continue to debate 
these questions in the future, but 
the documents appear to show that 
US government agencies had at 
least some inkling of Pinochet’s 
human rights violations.
Many scholars tend to see docu­
ments as “smoking guns,” the 
Rosetta stones that will allow them 
to decipher all of US policy or 
answer big historical questions. It 
is important to step back and think 
about who released a document and 
why. Taking an even bigger step 
back, it is also important to realize 
that policymakers are capable of 
writing documents that distort or 
cover up the truth. But the fact 
that scholars’ access to the Chilean 
documents hinged on a political 
decision—some would say political 
expediency, given the US govern­
ment’s desire to avoid an interna­
tional trial of Pinochet—does not 
detract from the truly remarkable 
fact of their release.
The CDP also has implications 
that go far beyond US-Chilean rela­
tions from 1968-1991. For exam­
ple, it revealed information about 
Operation Condor, the informa­
tion-sharing policies of a loose net­
work of Southern Cone intelligence 
agencies formed in the early to mid 
1970s to fight communism and 
“internal subversion” in Latin 
America and elsewhere. Operation 
Condor sponsored the first deadly 
act of terror on US soil—the 
September 1976 car bomb in 
Washington, D.C. that killed the 
former Chilean ambassador to the 
United States, Orlando Letelier del 
Solar.
The CDP does not give a full 
accounting of the US knowledge 
of, or role in, Operation Condor, 
but the documents it contains rep­
resent an important first step for 
researchers interested in this period. 
As scholars delve more deeply into 
the information released under the 
CDP, they are certain to find that 
the documents it made available 
raise (and may answer) important 
questions concerning US foreign 
policy that are not even being asked 
now.
Above all, the CDP is an impor­
tant educational resource. Only 
through a careful study of the his­
torical patterns of US diplomacy 
can citizens make informed deci­
sions about the successes and fail­
ures of past US foreign policy.
Such knowledge is an important 
factor in selecting our nation’s lead­
ers and determining the future tone 
of its international relations. ■
James F. Siekmeier is a researcher at 
the Office o f  the Historian o f  the US 
Department o f  State.
The ideas expressed here are the 
author’s and do not necessarily reflect 
the policy o f  the US Department o f  
State. The author w ould like to 
thank Peter Kornbluh, Catherine V. 
Tall, Edward C. Keefer and Stephen 
M. Streeter f o r  helpful comments on 
this paper.
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Gangsters and
by Vincent T. Gawronski
Prostitutes
“The great nations have always acted like 
gangsters, and the small nations like prosti­
tutes.”
—Stanley Kubrick
The Guardian, June 5, 1963
Great nations indeed may have always acted like gangsters and small nations like pros­titutes, but the United 
States also has some loyal friends. 
Great Britain (at least, Prime 
Minister Tony Blair), for example, 
unwaveringly backed the US-led Iraq 
war effort because of the longstand­
ing “special relationship” between the 
two countries. (Or, more cynical 
observers would argue, because the 
opportunity returned Great Britain 
to a role “East of Suez” after a 30- 
year absence.) Why, however, would 
a regional grouping of relatively 
small nation-states, which have 
directly experienced US quasi-impe- 
rialism, politically and militarily sup­
port the United States in Iraq? 
Specifically, why would every Central 
American government, in addition to 
that of the Dominican Republic, 
support the unilateral US decision to 
invade Iraq when the UN Security 
Council, Mexico and nearly all the 
South American governments did 
not—and when clear public majori­
ties throughout the region, including 
Central America itself, expressed 
strong opposition to the invasion? 
Three isthmus countries—El 
Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua—went so far as to send 
small troop contingents (with the 
Dominican Republic) to Spains Plus 
Ultra Battalion to assist in “stabiliza­
tion missions,” humanitarian relief 
and reconstruction efforts. Why 
would they do this?
The answer lies in the evolving 
nature of asymmetrical inter- 
American relations, which are now 
more intense and complicated than
when classic dependency theory was 
popular. Simply put, the Central 
American and Dominican elites 
committed their countries to sup­
porting the United States because 
they feared that even a neutral posi­
tion on the Iraq invasion might irri­
tate a notably sensitive, even cranky, 
Bush administration. Too much was 
at stake. Combined total merchan­
dise trade between the five Central 
American countries and the United 
States exceeds $23 billion, and the 
recent inclusion of the Dominican 
Republic in the Central American 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) will 
bring the total to more than $32 bil­
lion. With the hemisphere moving 
toward a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), the governments 
in power in Central America and the 
Dominican Republic at the time of 
the Iraq invasion were pro-United 
States and pro-free trade, with cen­
trist or conservative ruling political 
parties (see Table 1 on page 20).
Given their orientation and fearful 
of eventual US reprisals, conservative 
and neoliberal elites felt compelled to 
support US actions. This was easier 
in the immediate aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks, when world opinion 
supported a military response. 
Surveys conducted after 9/11 indi­
cated that Latin American countries 
with domestic terrorism experience 
expressed greater support for the US 
war on terror and had a higher opin­
ion of the United States. The pat­
tern was not uniform across the 
region, however; as Marta Lagos 
wrote in the International Journal o f  
Public Opinion Research (spring
2003),
In general, Central American 
countries have a much more favor­
able (85 percent) opinion o f  the 
United States than the rest o f  the 
region (71 percent); some o f  those 
countries’ economies depend on dol­
lars sent by relatives working in the 
United States, which are a signifi­
cant part o f  the national income. 
Their perception o f  terrorism as a 
world threat is higher (66percent) 
than it is in South America (57 
percent), much higher than in 
Mexico (46 percent). Their soli­
darity with the war against terror­
ism is accordingly higher, reaching 
almost one in two citizens o f  the 
Central American countries.
Opinions deteriorated as the Bush 
administration pushed for Iraqi 
“regime change,” which had little to 
do with the war on terrorism.
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Asymmetrical inter-American relations
Nonetheless, a coalition of lesser 
“powers” backed the United States by 
sending troops, including Honduras 
(370), El Salvador (360), the 
Dominican Republic (300), and 
Nicaragua (230).
One year after the invasion, eight 
countries had more than 1,000 
troops in Iraq. The United States, of 
course, had nearly 135,000. Few 
countries contributing troops expect­
ed to be involved in combat opera­
tions or to be directly attacked.
Their contributions were symbolic, 
but the violent escalations of April 
2004 and new socialist Prime 
Minister Jose Zapatero’s decision to 
withdraw Spanish troops forced 
coalition members to reconsider their 
commitments. Nicaragua decided 
earlier not to replace troops in rota­
tion for financial reasons. Honduras 
and the Dominican Republic fol­
lowed Spain’s lead, despite US diplo­
matic pressures. El Salvador, for 
now, will stay.
Historically, US relations with 
Central America and the Dominican 
Republic almost always have been 
uneasy, but the United States can 
now more easily coerce, reward and 
punish its friends and allies than ever 
before. For example, the US 
Department of State’s list of 63 
countries whose companies could 
compete in bidding for reconstruc­
tion projects in Iraq was limited to 
those whose governments expressed 
support for the US invasion. In 
Latin America, only those countries 
satisfying US Department of State 
contract standards—Panama, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia 
and the Dominican Republic—were 
awarded bidding rights, and in the
end no company from these coun­
tries made a bid.
Latin American Reactions to the 
Iraq War
A Gallup International poll of 41 
countries worldwide conducted after 
the start of the Iraq invasion found 
that Argentines, followed by 
Uruguayans, opposed the invasion 
most, as did nearly as many 
Chileans and Peruvians in separate 
surveys. Latinobarometro 2003 
results showed that 87% of Latin 
Americans surveyed held unfavor­
able opinions of President Bush and 
that negative images of the United 
States had more than doubled since 
2000 (from 14% to 31%).
Although 60% of Latin Americans 
retained a positive image of the 
United States, this was down from 
71% in 2000. Interestingly, Central 
Americans were inclined to be more 
positive about the United States 
(85%) than South Americans (65%) 
and Mexicans (63%) in 2003.
Globally, few leaders voiced strong 
support and solidarity for the 
United States, but only the larger, 
more significant countries were able 
to stick to their principles. Along 
with Chile, Mexico, a Latin 
American member of the UN 
Security Council, opposed the US 
decision to invade Iraq. This soured 
President Fox’s once close personal 
relationship with President Bush, 
who had declared early in his presi­
dency that no other country was as 
important to the United States as 
Mexico. Many observers hoped for 
significant progress during the two 
leaders’ overlapping terms on trade, 
drug trafficking and, especially,
immigration. Of course, 9/11 
abruptly changed the Bush adminis­
tration’s priorities, and the Fox gov­
ernment’s principled stance on Iraq 
temporarily damaged Mexico-US 
relations. Some of Fox’s advisers 
urged him to be more moderate but 
Adolfo Aguilar, Mexico’s representa­
tive on the UN Security Council, 
said that Mexico would not be sub­
ordinated to the United States and 
was more concerned with develop­
ing a mature— “not a prostituted”— 
relationship with its neighbor to the 
north. For its part, after opposing 
the United States in the Security 
Council, Chile became less vocal in 
its criticism and President Ricardo 
Lagos and his administration 
refrained from direct challenges.
In marked contrast to most of 
Latin America, every Central 
American government, as well as 
that of the Dominican Republic, 
expressed support for the US-led 
invasion. Of course, Plan Colombia 
locked the Alvaro Uribe administra­
tion into politically backing the 
United States, although Colombia 
did not send troops. Guatemala 
considered sending some of its forces 
but the government realized that it 
could not bear the financial costs or 
the domestic political opposition. 
Panama also extended political sup­
port but contributed no troops. For 
50 years Costa Rica has not had a 
national military, but still President 
Abel Pacheco stated publicly: “I 
would rather Iraqi children die than 
Latin American and Costa Rican 
children,” adding, “we are loyal allies 
to a loyal friend.” Surveys indicated 
that the majority of Costa Ricans 
opposed his stance.
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Ideological Orientation
Country President Political Parties in Power (2003-2004) of Ruling Parties
Costa Rica Abel Pacheco 
(2002- )
Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) Alliance of Christian Democrats 
and center-right conservatives
El Salvador Francisco Flores 
(1999-2004)
Tony Saca 
(2004- )
National Republican Alliance (ARENA) Right-wing conservative
Guatemala Alfonso Portillo 
(2000-2004)
Guatemalan Republican Front Authoritarian
Oscar Berger 
(2004- )
Grand National Alliance Alliance of liberals and 
center-right conservatives
Honduras Ricardo Maduro 
(2002- )
National Party Conservative
Nicaragua Enrique Bolanos 
(2001- )
Liberal Constitutionalist Party Center-right conservative
Dominican
Republic
Hipolito Mejfa 
(2000-2004)
Dominican Revolutionary Party Social-Democrat
Source: www.electionworld.org/
The Nicaraguan government 
approved the deployment of troops 
to join the “humanitarian assistance 
task force,” but the leftist Sandinistas 
considered it to be an “offense to 
national dignity” and a CID-Gallup 
poll found that more than 80% of 
Nicaraguans opposed sending troops 
to Iraq. Once nicknamed “USS 
Honduras,” Honduras has long been 
an ally of the United States with a 
significant US military presence and 
millions of dollars in US aid, espe­
cially after Hurricane Mitch. The 
Honduran government sent a mixed 
battalion to conduct “stabilization 
missions.”
President Francisco Flores of El 
Salvador voiced strong support for
the United States and his administra­
tion’s troop contribution was an act 
of thanks for the international com­
munity’s backing of the 1992 peace 
accords that ended the civil war in 
that country. Of course, the leftist 
FMLN fiercely opposed the decision, 
but despite growing domestic oppo­
sition to El Salvador’s involvement 
the conservative ARENA stayed in 
office after the March 2004 elec­
tions. ARENA candidate Tony Saca 
handily defeated former guerrilla 
leader Shafik Handal because many 
Salvadorans feared an FMLN victory 
would stall economic growth and 
endanger US-Salvadoran relations.
In campaign advertisements, the rul­
ing party warned that the United
States could terminate the temporary 
asylum status of Salvadorans, result­
ing in thousands of deportations and 
the loss of millions of dollars in 
remittances.
The Importance of Remittances
The presence of so many Central 
Americans and Dominicans in the 
United States figured mightily in the 
decision by these countries’ govern­
ments to support the United States. 
According to the US Census Bureau, 
close to four million Central 
Americans reside in the United States 
and nearly half a million undocu­
mented Salvadorans, Hondurans and 
Nicaraguans have temporary protec­
tive status. El Salvador and the
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Ta b l e  2 :  T o t a l  GDP, HDI R a n k in g , ODA R e c e iv e d  P e r  C a p it a , a n d  N e t  FDI I n f l o w s  
a s  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  GDP
Country
Total GDP in 
billions (2002)
Human 
Development 
Index Ranking 
(2003)
ODA in 
Millions 
(2001)
ODA Per 
Capita in 
Dollars 
(2001)
Net FDI 
Inflows as 
Percentage of 
GDP (2001)
Costa Rica $16.9 42 2.2 (•) 2.8
El Salvador $14.3 105 234.5 37.1 1.9
Guatemala $23.3 119 225.2 1.1 2.2
Honduras $6.6 115 677.7 10.6 3.1
Nicaragua $4.0 121 928.3 n/a (•)
Dominican Republic $21.2 94 105.4 12.4 5.6
Source: United Nations Human Development Report 2003
Dominican Republic have the high­
est percentages of their populations 
in the United States and, along with 
Mexico and Cuba, account for the 
most foreign-born immigrants from 
Latin America.
Remittances now surpass US 
Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) and foreign direct invest­
ment (FDI) as Central Americas 
most important source of foreign 
capital. Often in partnership with 
proliferating nongovernmental 
organizations, ODA has been direct­
ed to support democratic gover­
nance, human rights, and commer­
cial and infrastructure development. 
The United States Agency for 
International Development dedicat­
ed an additional $47 million to trade 
capacity building in 2003, a 74% 
increase over 2002. Three coun­
tries—El Salvador, Honduras and 
the Dominican Republic—relied 
heavily on ODA in 2001 (see Table 
2).
Nonetheless, according to the 
Inter-American Dialogue Task Force
on Remittances, remittances were 
more than twice the amount of 
ODA in 2002, amounting “to some 
$32 billion dollars—or about 2 per­
cent of the regions Gross National 
Product and more than triple the 
$10 billion they comprised just a 
half dozen years ago. ” Remittances 
to Mexico jumped to more than $13 
billion in 2003. They are even more 
important for the smaller, poorer 
nation-states in Central America and 
the Caribbean, the task force found:
In 2002, remittances accounted fo r  
nearly 30 percent o f  Nicaragua’s 
GDP and 25 percent o f  Haiti’s. 
They amounted to more than 10 
percen t o f  GDP in two other 
Central American countries— 
El Salvador (15 percen t) and  
Honduras (12 percent)—and in 
two Caribbean nations—Guyana 
(17 percent) and Jamaica (12 per­
cent). In Haiti and Jamaica, 
remittances are greater than rev­
enues from  trade. In three other 
countries—El Salvador, Nicaragua,
and the Dominican Republic— 
they are more than one-third the 
value o f  all exports. Mexico, with a 
population o f  some 100 million, 
receives nearly a third o f  all remit­
tances to Latin America. But El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
and the Dominican Republic, with 
a combined population o f  only 33 
million, capture more than 40per­
cent o f  all remittances flow s to the 
region.
The source country, of course, can 
easily tinker legislatively with remit­
tances and use them as a “political 
weapon.” It is surely no coincidence 
that the countries that capture 40% 
of all remittances to Latin America 
contributed troops to the occupation 
of Iraq. The importance of remit­
tances to daily life in many Latin 
American countries cannot be over­
estimated. Many families have 
become dependent on them, and for 
the poorest, remittances provide a
continued on page 44
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Widening the War on Terror
by Astrid Arraras and Grace Ivana Deheza
Relations between the United States and Latin America changed substantially after September 11, 2001. During the first months of his 
administration, George W. Bush 
announced that Latin America 
would become a central priority of 
US foreign policy. After the 9/11 
attacks, however, the locus of Bush’s 
foreign policy priorities shifted to 
the Middle East. Within the 
framework of the “war on terror,” 
US foreign policy now emphasizes 
combating participants and sup­
porters of fundamentalist Islamic 
terrorist organizations. In light of 
these developments, some scholars 
and policy makers dismiss Latin 
America as an Atlantis, or lost con­
tinent. But the region is still 
important to the United States, at 
least in terms of security policies. 
Since 9/11, the United States has 
extended its “war on terror” to 
Latin America. In pursuing this 
anti-terrorist crusade, the Bush 
administration has focused on spe­
cific countries and sub regions 
including Colombia, the Mexican 
border, and the Triple Frontier area 
of South America.
After 9/11, the cornerstone of US 
foreign policy toward Latin 
America became the “war on ter­
ror.” As part of this campaign, the 
Bush administration has redefined 
terrorism as a catch-all concept that 
includes guerrilla warfare, paramili­
tary activities, narcotics production 
and trafficking, illegal migration, 
arms and human trafficking, and 
money laundering. These terrorist- 
linked activities, the Bush adminis­
tration argues, are not limited to a 
particular country or region and 
have a spillover effect that surpasses 
state borders. The security policy 
of the United States in Latin 
America, therefore, focuses on the 
fight against terrorist activities and 
organizations that threaten the 
security of specific countries, sub- 
regions or the hemisphere in gener­
al.
Hemispheric Trouble Spots
Colombia is the centerpiece of 
US anti terrorist efforts in Latin 
America. This war-torn country is 
the third largest recipient of US 
military aid (after Israel and Egypt). 
Colombia is one of the world’s 
leading producers and exporters of 
narcotics and is home to three of 
the 28 groups listed by the US 
State Department as foreign terror­
ist organizations. Of the three, two 
are left-wing guerrilla organiza­
tions—the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 
the National Liberation Army 
(ELN)—and the other is a right- 
wing paramilitary coalition, the 
United Self-Defense Groups of 
Colombia (AUC). These armed 
factions have been involved in ter­
rorist activities such as bombings, 
murder and abductions, as well as 
narcotics production and traffick­
ing. After 9/11, the Bush adminis­
tration began viewing any country 
with armed groups as a potential 
host of terrorism. It also eliminat­
ed the distinction between terror­
ism and drug production or traf­
ficking with the insight that terror­
ist and narcotics problems are inter­
twined and should be dealt with as
a whole. The Bush White House 
perceives Colombian “narcoterror­
ism” as a major national and inter­
national security threat with a 
potential spillover effect in neigh­
boring countries.
In response to the perceived 
threat posed by “narcoterrorism,” 
the United States made important 
changes in its security policy 
toward Colombia. From 1999 
until 2002, under the so-called 
Plan Colombia, the United States 
limited its economic assistance to 
efforts to crack down on narcotics 
production and trafficking. Since 
2002, President Bush has sought 
and obtained authorization from 
the Congress to continue US assis­
tance to Colombia in these areas 
and to extend it to combating guer­
rillas and paramilitary groups. In
2002, the United States gave 
Colombia $31 million for police 
post support and counter-terrorism 
equipment and training. For the 
2003 budget, Bush requested and 
received approval from Congress to 
allocate $93 million for helicopters, 
training and other assistance for the 
Colombian army to protect the 
Cano-Limon Covenas pipeline, 
operated by the California-based 
Occidental Petroleum Company, 
from attacks by terrorist groups. To 
further enhance the counter­
terrorist capabilities of the 
Colombian Armed Forces, Bush 
requested $110 million in the 2004 
budget. The stated purpose of this 
funding is to provide more equip­
ment and training to protect the 
pipeline and combat narcoterrorism.
Closer to home, the United 
States also pays attention to poten­
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US security policy toward Latin America since 9/11
A member o f  Colombia’s antinarcotics police fo r ce  on board a US-donated Black Hawk helicopter surveys the operations o f  a T- 
65 spray plane used to eradicate opium poppies under cultivation in the mountains ofHuila. The Bush administration has 
redefined terrorism as a catch-all concept to include narcotics production and trafficking.
tial terrorist threats from its 1,951- 
mile southern border with Mexico. 
Encouraged by Mexican President 
Vicente Fox and seeking to gain 
support from the Hispanic commu­
nity, President Bush made some 
steps toward reforming US immi­
gration policy toward Mexico dur­
ing the first months of his adminis­
tration. In the wake of the events
of 9/11, this progress came to a 
halt. According to the Bush 
administration, a liberal immigra­
tion policy with Mexico could serve 
as a channel for terrorists, illegal 
immigrants, illegal drugs, and arms 
and human trafficking, posing a 
serious threat to national security.
After 9/11, the US invited 
Mexico, as it had Canada previous­
ly, to cooperate in the establish­
ment of “smart borders.” The goal 
was twofold: to facilitate the legal 
movement of people and goods 
into and out of the United States, 
and to protect the United States by 
strengthening border security. The 
smart borders plan provides for 
laser scan identification cards for 
frequent border commuters, x-ray
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facilities, shared computer databas­
es, and special lanes for pre-inspect- 
ed shipments. To improve border 
security and the development of 
smart borders, President Bush pro­
posed $10.7 billion for the 2003 
budget, an increase of $2.1 billion 
from 2002.
Another security concern for the 
United States is the area of South 
America known as the Triple 
Border Area (TBA). The region 
where Argentina, Brazil and 
Paraguay converge hosts a large 
Arab population and State 
Department reports describe it as a 
hotbed of illegal activity, including 
arms and drug trafficking, smug­
gling, document and currency 
fraud, money laundering, and dis­
tribution of pirated goods. More 
significant in this case, the State 
Department also characterizes the 
TBA as a hub for Hezbollah and 
Hamas activities, especially financ­
ing and logistics. Since the bomb­
ings attributed to Hezbollah in 
Argentina in 1992 and 1994, US 
government officials have become 
increasingly concerned about the 
presence of Arab radicals in the 
TBA.
The 9/11 attacks brought 
renewed attention from the United 
States and the TBA countries to the 
presence of Arab radicals in the 
region. During 2002, the TBA 
countries cooperated in investigat­
ing and disrupting illegal financial 
activities linked to Arab terrorist 
groups. In December 2002, these 
governments invited the United 
States to join a counterterrorism 
consultative and cooperation mech­
anism known as the Three Plus 
One (the three TBA countries plus 
the United States) to analyze and 
combat terrorist threats. A main 
issue tackled by the Three Plus One 
has been alleged terrorist fundrais­
ing on behalf of Hezbollah and 
Hamas in the TBA. Since 2001,
the State Department has been 
unable to confirm allegations of the 
presence of Osama Bin Laden and 
A1 Qaeda support cells in the TBA, 
although these leads have been 
examined by US and local intelli­
gence and law enforcement organi­
zations.
In addition to the TBA, the 
United States has become con­
cerned about potential security 
threats in the Caribbean region. 
Financial institutions on several 
Caribbean islands are known to 
benefit from money laundering 
operations. Since the 9/11 attacks, 
the United States has developed 
some security measures along its 
“third border” in the Caribbean.
As part of a third border initiative, 
the United States aims to establish 
security cooperation with 
Caribbean nations to address such 
problems as arms, drugs and 
human trafficking, and money 
laundering. In the specific case of 
money laundering, the United 
States is launching a set of financial 
security measures aimed at the 
banking system in Latin America, 
especially the Caribbean.
Implications for US-Latin 
American Relations
The United States’ emphasis on 
security challenges and problems in 
Latin America has important impli­
cations. Under the logic of the war 
on terror, the Bush administration 
is concentrating efforts and 
resources on bilateral relations with 
repressive forces in Latin American 
countries, including the police and 
the armed forces. US support for 
these institutions could result in 
unpredictable consequences in 
Latin America. A 2004 United 
Nations Development Programme 
survey found that only 43% of 
Latin Americans fully supported 
democracy in their countries and 
that 54.7% would be willing to
consider an authoritarian govern­
ment. The empowering of the mil­
itary and the police could threaten 
recently democratized countries or 
even the established democracies of 
the region. In addition, the US 
emphasis on security policy diverts 
sorely needed resources from non- 
traditional threats, such as poverty, 
social exclusion and weak demo­
cratic institutions, which also affect 
the security of Latin American 
countries.
Some recent developments raise 
hope for the future of bilateral 
security policy as well as the solu­
tion of Latin America’s critical 
problems. The Organization of 
American States’ Special 
Conference on Security 
Convention has made progress in 
including non-traditional threats on 
the agenda of hemispheric security. 
This conference could become a 
new platform to promote multilat­
eral cooperation and attention to 
critical problems affecting the 
region. Without a renewed and 
more inclusive perspective on hemi­
spheric security, relations between 
the United States and Latin 
America could become even more 
distant and strained. ■
Astrid Arrards is an assistant professor 
o f  politica l science a t Florida 
International University and director 
o f  academ ic programs fo r  the Latin 
American and Caribbean Center. 
Grace Ivana Deheza is an adjunct 
professor in the University’s School o f  
Journalism and Mass 
Communication.
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The Remittance
by Mariana M artinez
Lifeline
Money sent from abroad helps 
Salvadoran families survive but 
hasnt changed the roots o f povertyA
lberto Rodriguez, 29, 
arrived in the United 
States four years ago 
with one goal: to get a 
job that would allow 
him to support his family He 
could not achieve this goal in his 
own country, El Salvador, where 
unemployment rates are high due 
to a precarious economy.
Every morning, Alberto gets up 
at 5:45 and walks to the corner of 
Shallowford Road and Bufford 
Highway in Atlanta, Georgia, 
where he often waits several hours 
to be picked up for short-term jobs. 
Once a week, he walks three miles 
to a remittances center to send his 
savings to his wife, Isaura, who 
stayed behind in El Salvador with 
their four children. He sends 
almost all of his wages to feed and 
educate them. These remittances 
have been their lifeline and have 
allowed Isaura to start a small street 
business selling pupusas (a type of 
stuffed tortilla) in front of a factory. 
She has also been able to begin 
work on the initial stages of a small 
brick house in Soyapango, a neigh­
borhood of San Salvador. The 
whole family dreams of the day 
Alberto will return home, but they 
know that it will take a long time 
for their dream to come true.
Alberto’s story is typical of mil­
lions of his countrymen. More 
than two million Salvadorans have 
left their homeland to enter the 
United States, legally or illegally, in 
search of jobs that will allow them 
to send money to their families.
The phenomenon appears to be 
unstoppable in El Salvador, where 
remittances reached a record high
of $2.1 billion in 2003 and contin­
ued to increase in the first months 
of 2004. According to the Central 
Bank of El Salvador, the volume of 
remittances jumped 20.4% in the 
first quarter of the current year. 
Remittances already represent 
67.1% of the total value of net 
exports from this small Central 
American country and 14.03% of 
total 2003 GDP.
We know why Salvadorans decide 
to migrate and why they are send­
ing money to their families, but 
several other important questions 
about remittances remain to be 
answered: How is the money being 
used? And, more important, are 
remittances improving living stan­
dards and playing a fundamental 
role in the economic development 
of the country?
In March 2004, I conducted a 
survey in San Salvador to try to 
answer these questions. The survey 
included 429 subjects selected from 
a socioeconomic cross-section of 
the metropolitan area of San 
Salvador, which has 1.2 million 
inhabitants. The people inter­
viewed were adults (18 years and 
older) who received remittances 
from relatives in the United States. 
The survey was supplemented by 
an in-depth interview with a 
Salvadoran family and a focus
group of 15 individuals from differ­
ent sectors of the capital’s popula­
tion.
The study found that, on aver­
age, Salvadorans receive about $200 
per month from relatives living 
abroad. They use this money fun­
damentally to cover their basic 
needs (food and living expenses). 
The extra dollars have helped 
increase family incomes in El 
Salvador, where the minimum wage 
is 42 colones ($4.80) per day. But 
while remittances help alleviate the 
relative poverty in which people 
live, they do not eliminate it or cre­
ate better living conditions for 
Salvadorans. Remittances have cre­
ated an “artificial” economy that is 
based not on productivity but on 
external elements.
The Household Impact of 
Remittances
More than 70% of respondents 
to the March survey said they 
received remittances once a month. 
Another 21.21% received them 
twice a month, and 5.36% received 
remittances more than three times 
per month. The data show that 
remittances are not being used in 
the productive cycle of the 
Salvadoran economy, but rather are 
needed to cover immediate house­
hold expenses. When the recipients
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were asked how they used the 
money they received, slightly more 
than half (50.8%) said they spent 
the money mostly on food.
Another 18.2% reported using it 
for education, 10.5% for health 
expenses, and 8.4% to pay rent. 
Only 4.2% used the money prima­
rily to operate or open a small busi­
ness, and just 1.6% said they put it 
into savings. A larger percentage of 
respondents used at least some por­
tion of remittances for long-term 
goals once basic needs were cov­
ered. More than 50% of the recipi­
ents declared that they used part of 
the money to study, while 16.3% 
said they applied it to start their 
own small businesses (81.8% trade, 
16.7% services, and 3.03% agricul­
ture).
Most of those who receive remit­
tances are women (64.4%), and 
those who send them are mostly 
men. People 30 years old or under 
are most likely to receive money 
from their relatives abroad. The 
likelihood of receiving money 
decreases after 30 and increases 
once again among recipients who 
are 50 or older. This reflects the 
fact that young women tend to 
remain in El Salvador in charge of 
the family unit while their hus­
bands migrate to the US to earn 
better incomes. Respect for familial 
bonds makes it unnecessary to 
establish any method of control for 
the use of the money beyond a ver­
bal agreement.
People 50 and older use remit­
tances mostly for medicine and 
health care, while those between 
the ages of 20 and 30 rely on them 
to pay for education. An end to 
remittances, therefore, would jeop­
ardize the daily survival of many 
families. Sustenance and education 
would be hardest hit, with savings 
and health care significantly affect­
ed.
Implications for the National 
Economy
In the last 20 years, the 
Salvadoran economy has grown 
increasingly reliant on the flow of 
foreign remittances. The continu­
ous flow of dollars into the country 
was one factor behind the govern­
ment’s decision to adopt a policy of 
dollarization and has created a 
strong dependency on the US econ­
omy. As a result, the country is 
extremely vulnerable to external 
shocks. Without the development 
of savings and investment, the 
economy will need ever greater 
daily flows of dollars to survive, cre­
ating a vicious cycle that only 
increases El Salvador’s dependence 
on the amount of remittances its 
citizens receive.
The families interviewed 
described remittances as an element 
of economic survival rather than as 
extra income that would allow 
them to improve their economic 
status. They reported using most 
of the money to purchase consumer 
goods, not to invest or save. This 
trend underscores the necessity of 
creating a culture of savings among 
Salvadorans and introducing the 
resources from remittances into the 
productive cycle of the economy to 
generate sustainable economic 
growth. This will be extremely dif­
ficult as long as the recipients of 
remittances belong to the poorest 
sectors of the population.
It is vital for El Salvador to estab­
lish economic mechanisms that can 
generate sustainable growth. The 
March survey suggests one poten­
tial avenue to help change the “arti­
ficial” structure of the economy 
into one based on the development 
of internal forces. The survey and 
focus groups reveal that most 
Salvadorans would explore the pos­
sibility of opening their own small 
businesses if they had the resources 
to do so, if the national economy
improved, or if they had the neces­
sary training. The study found that 
76.2% of those interviewed who do 
not own their own business would 
be “interested” in opening one, as 
opposed to 23.8% who answered 
they were “not interested at all.”
The reasons for not starting a busi­
ness included lack of savings 
(19.35%) or the state of the nation­
al economy (17.2%).
At the same time, the study 
found that Salvadorans, unlike 
most other Latin Americans, are 
comfortable using the banking sys­
tem. In El Salvador it is not 
unusual to see a peasant walk into a 
bank to withdraw money from an 
account or an ATM machine. In 
fact, most of the interviewees said 
that they receive remittances 
through the banking system 
(60.6%). This is an indication of 
the strength of El Salvador’s bank­
ing culture and of a good environ­
ment for establishing micro-loans.
Based on these findings, the 
study recommends that the 
Salvadoran government and non­
governmental organizations 
(NGOs) create support plans for 
the recipients of remittances by 
establishing small investment proj­
ects (urban and rural) to channel 
resources received from abroad in a 
productive manner. This ambitious 
goal can only be reached through 
development of a culture of savings 
(via public relations campaigns, 
educational programs, etc.) and 
establishment of micro-loans as a 
fundamental tool in the country’s 
economy
How could the government do 
this? One important factor would 
be to persuade financial institutions 
to change their lending policies for 
applicants requesting micro-loans. 
Instead of requiring the usual col­
lateral, the banks should put their 
trust in the labor force, in the rev­
enues that would be generated from
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the initial investment of capital, 
and the remittances Salvadorans 
like Isaura receive from abroad on a 
regular basis. Once Salvadorans 
can open a small business they 
could use remittances to improve it 
or put the money into savings, 
while using the revenues generated 
by the small business to support 
their families and pay back the 
micro-loans.
The rising total of remittances is 
not simply a result of migration, 
but also one of its causes. Among 
the main reasons Salvadorans cite 
for leaving their homes are vio­
lence, public insecurity, unemploy­
ment, and the desire to help rela­
tives by sending money from 
abroad. When remittances become 
essential for the survival of a large 
percentage of the population, as is 
the case in El Salvador, it is only 
logical to expect people to continue 
to look for income sources outside 
the country in the following years.
Only if remittances enter the pro­
ductive economic cycle, allowing 
the economy of El Salvador to 
change from an artificial structure 
to a productive one that is sustain­
able in the long run, will Alberto 
and other Salvadoran migrants be 
able to fulfill their dream of coming 
home. ■
M anana Martinez is writing her 
thesis on remittances fo r  the Master o f  
Arts in Latin American and  
Caribbean Studies at Florida 
International University. She works 
as an econom ic analyst f o r  the BBC.
CUBAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
6th Conference on Cuban and Cuban-American Studies 
“Politics and Culture”
October 27-29, 2005 • Florida International University
CALL FOR PAPERS AND PANELS
The Cuban Research Institute continues the tradition of convening schol­
ars engaged in the study of Cuba and Cuban-Americans by announcing its 
6th Conference. We encourage the submission of panels and papers in all 
areas of intellectual inquiry relevant to the history, economics, politics, cul­
ture, society, and creative expression of Cuba and its diaspora. The overar­
ching theme of the 6th Conference is “Politics and Culture.” All proposals 
for individual papers will be considered, although we prefer proposals for 
full panels.
G uidelin es f o r  p r e s en t in g  p a n e ls  a n d  p a p er s  
Panels should include four paper presentations, a chair (who may be one of 
the presenters) and a discussant. Panels may include up to but no more 
than five paper presentations if they do not include a discussant. 
Participants may perform two roles at the conference (chair, discussant, 
roundtable participant, paper presenter) but may not present more than one 
paper. Submissions may be in English or Spanish.
Proposals for panels or roundtables must include a general description of the 
theme and one-page abstracts of each participant’s paper. The following 
information must be submitted for each participant: full name, academic 
affiliation, preferred addresses, office and home phone numbers, fax, and e- 
mail address. Persons wishing to submit individual papers must present a 
one-page abstract and all pertinent personal data.
As in previous years, the CRI will offer a limited number of partial travel 
grants to graduate students and junior scholars. Applicants should indicate 
their interest in and need for such support.
Deadline for submission of all paper and panel proposals is January 15,
2005. Notifications of acceptance (and regrets) will be mailed by April 15,
2005.
For further information about the conference and other CRI activities, 
please see our website at http://lacc.fiu.edu/cri/ or contact Damian
Fernandez, Director (Damian.Fernandez@fiu.edu) or Uva de Aragon,
Associate Director (Uva.De_Aragon@fiu.edu).
CUBAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Florida International University 
DM 363, University Park, Miami, FL 33199 
(305) 348-1991/Fax (305) 348-3593 
crinst@fiu.edu
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Binational Cooperation
by Dennis J. Bixler-Marquez
T he political and busi­ness leaders of transnational commu­nities on international borders have learned to examine the dictates of their 
political centers through a prism 
that gauges the impact on their 
regions of national and global inter­
ests. The primary challenge for 
such communities is informing and 
affecting national policy to their 
benefit, including minimizing the 
unavoidable negative impact of 
commercial or political disloca­
tions.
Historically, the biggest political 
issue that has confronted commu­
nities on the US-Mexico border is 
finding a place on the political and 
fiscal agendas of their respective 
nations and, in some cases, their 
states. Since September 11, 2001, 
however, national security measures 
have drastically modified the man­
agement of the flow of people and 
commerce at border crossings and 
ports of entry. Washington, D.C. 
and Mexico City have moved bor­
der management to the forefront of 
their bilateral relations, shifting 
away from their earlier unilateral­
ism in policy formulation and 
application. Current globalization 
trends, such as the flight of 
maquiladoras from Mexico to 
China, the increase of undocu­
mented immigration to the US, 
and the implementation of new 
security measures have prompted 
concerted political action by enti­
ties on the US-Mexico border and 
responses from federal entities in 
both nations.
Rather than decry the obvious
negative potential of new security 
policies and wait for a more auspi­
cious time to renew the bilateral 
dialogue on border-relevant issues, 
the leadership of the US-Mexico 
bo der region recognized that the 
events of 9/11 had placed the bor­
der high on the political agenda and 
organized for political action. The 
challenge to transnational commu­
nities and other less integrated bor­
der areas changed from attracting 
the attention of their political cen­
ters to leveraging their newly gained 
prominence. A further challenge 
became how to mesh US security 
interests with the local and global 
economic agendas. In a climate of 
post-9/11 hysteria, the political and 
business leadership of transnational 
communities such as El Paso, 
Texas/Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua 
recognized the need to transform 
the region’s image in the eyes of the 
US public and government. 
Specifically, they sought to change 
the perception that an improved 
flow of people and commerce into 
the US automatically translates into 
lax national security and a danger­
ous southern border. Global corpo­
rations and trade organizations con­
cerned about the new security meas­
ures coalesced with political groups 
such as the US congressional border 
and Hispanic caucuses and the US- 
Mexico border governors to lobby 
federal entities to improve border 
management. The Mexican govern­
ment also realized the political and 
economic benefits of playing an 
active role in the protection of the 
United States’ southern perimeter 
and became a strategic stakeholder 
in American security.
The US-Mexico Border after 9/11
The events of 9/11 and the subse­
quent war with Iraq affected the 
political and economic relations of 
the United States and Mexico along 
their common 2,000-mile border.
US Homeland Security legislation 
and previous stopgap measures 
played an important role in this 
binational relation. As J. M.
Heyman (2001) points out, interna­
tional crossings typically absorb the 
impact of the official national policy 
of the moment, particularly in 
administrative sectors. But while 
administrative problems that 
impinged on binational commerce 
and economic development in the 
border region intensified after 9/11, 
other problems were gradually allevi­
ated during this unstable period as 
regionally crafted political strategies 
brought long-sought federal atten­
tion to the southern US border.
This analysis focuses on binational 
commerce and transportation on the 
US-Mexican border, using examples 
and statistics mostly from, but not 
limited to, the metropolitan area that 
includes El Paso, Ciudad Juarez and 
small communities in southern New 
Mexico that border the states of 
Texas and Chihuahua. Binational 
commerce and transportation were 
selected due to their importance to 
the maquiladora industry in Mexico 
and border metropolitan areas, par­
ticularly in the context of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). US national security pol­
icy and legislation, as well as the sub­
sequent administrative measures 
applied on the border, are examined 
in light of globalization patterns 
manifesting themselves in the region.
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Homeland security and the politics o f  
transportation and commerce
Also included is a conceptualization 
of how binational and regional inte­
gration measures can be crafted 
politically under the umbrella of pro­
posed federal expenditures and secu­
rity regulations in the region.
Commerce and Transportation
Before 9/11, commercial relations 
between the United States and 
Mexico were strained regarding such 
issues as non-competitive Mexican 
agricultural products, binational 
commercial transportation under 
NAFTA, water rights pertaining to 
the Colorado and Rio Grande rivers, 
and the perennial immigration 
debate. The sluggish US economy 
also had a negative impact on the 
border region, particularly the 
maquiladora industry. Trade 
between Mexico and the US 
declined, complicating negotiations 
in controversial areas such as tariffs 
and farm subsidies.
On 9/11, border crossing points 
were closed and US federal authori­
ties began to implement stricter secu­
rity measures that emulated 
Operation Intercept, the 1969 pro­
gram that was the most intensive 
federal interdiction effort until that 
time. A Nixon administration strate­
gy to pressure Mexico economically 
to play a proactive role in the war 
against drugs, Operation Intercept 
called for all vehicles entering the 
United States to be inspected. The 
documents of travelers, particularly 
pedestrians, were scrutinized careful­
ly. When these measures were rein­
troduced in fall 2001, the time it 
took to cross into the United States 
went from an average of 45 minutes 
to an average of two to three hours.
Pedestrian, vehicular and commercial 
flows were reduced to an alarming 
level, affecting the regional economy 
immediately. The products of 
assembly plants owned by US and 
other foreign companies began to 
pile up on the Mexican side. Retail 
and wholesale sales on both sides of 
the border were affected as border 
dwellers delayed social visits and 
shopping trips to avoid long lines 
and possible mistreatment by 
American authorities. Long crossing 
times became the norm again after 
the start of the war with Iraq in
2003 but soon abated significantly 
due to infrastructure improvements 
and an increase in US Customs per­
sonnel.
Mexican authorities also increased 
their vigilance, but to a level and in a 
manner that did not significantly 
affect commerce or the binational 
flow of the border population. After 
the start of the war with Iraq, the 
Mexican army deployed some of its 
units to urban and rural border 
crossings. Mexican immigration 
officials increased their scrutiny of 
visitors entering Mexico from Islamic 
countries and of travelers bound to 
the US. The Iraq war prompted 
Mexico to launch Operation 
Sentinel, a program designed to pro­
tect its northern and southern bor­
ders, other points of entry such as 
seaports and airports, tourist sites 
and critical infrastructure.
This increased monitoring had 
some objective consequences for the 
regional economy and public percep­
tion of the border. Even though the 
war on drugs took a back seat to 
national security concerns, contra­
band to the US diminished and
interdiction of narcotics and illicit 
merchandise increased dramatically 
in 2002. Fugitives from American 
justice who had crossed back and 
forth over the border with impunity 
were captured routinely in 2002 and
2003. But drug traffickers sought 
alternate routes into the US and the 
smuggling of human cargo increased, 
as well as its cost in terms of dollars 
and lives lost.
The positive results of increased 
monitoring and interdiction did not 
go unnoticed in the United States, 
where the American public asked, 
why wasn’t the border policed this 
way previously? On both sides of 
the border, political and civic leaders, 
chambers of commerce and interna­
tional transportation associations 
began to lobby US federal authorities 
for agents and equipment to create a 
more efficient inspection system. 
They warned of a catastrophic deteri­
oration of the border economy if an 
enhanced inspection system and 
ancillary improvements failed to 
materialize. On the US side, the 
lobbying was led by local spokesper­
sons emphasizing patriotism and rec­
ognizing the necessity to maintain a 
state of vigilance for the sake of 
national security.
Initial Security Measures to 
Monitor Trade and Transportation
Renewed federal attention to the 
border region brought some early 
positive results in the form of infra­
structure development. The national 
security program authorized by 
Congress in 2002 assigned sophisti­
cated equipment for the inspection 
of commercial vehicles, trailers and 
containers. Homeland security legis­
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Administrative binational cooperation on the 
border is politically feasible, even under diffi­
cult political circumstances. If US national 
security policy is properly incorporated into 
requests and dialogue on regional require­
ments, smart borders are possible.
lation authorized the development 
and implementation of an electronic 
registration system for passports, 
visas and other documents, as well as 
the tracking of all who enter and 
leave the country legally by 2005. 
This tracking system incorporates 
biometric technology that enables 
the recognition of body features, 
allowing closer inspection of human 
traffic across the border. In 2003 
most visitors and immigrants were 
still registered only when entering 
the country. The new outflow 
inspection will likely cause delays in 
the tourist and commercial flow 
from the US to Mexico until effec­
tive logistics for its implementation 
are in place.
Ironically, many border interests, 
as well as federal agencies directly 
concerned with border security, had 
clamored for improvements of the 
immigration, customs and law 
enforcement infrastructure on the 
border for decades before 9/11, with 
few results. It was not until the 
region’s leadership articulated a new 
marketing strategy—labeling the 
requests as integral components of 
the new national security policy and, 
to a lesser degree, a stimulus to 
regional commerce—that the federal 
authorities acceded. The same pat­
tern is true of pre-9/11 requests for 
the electronic visa readers held by 
many visitors. The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service did not 
receive this equipment until after
9/11, when its use was deemed vital 
to national security.
Binational Relations and Regional 
Integration in an Era of 
Heightened National Security
On March 22, 2002, Presidents 
Bush and Fox signed the US-Mexico 
Border Partnership Agreement in 
Monterrey, Mexico. The so-called 
“Smart Border Plan” aims to imple­
ment a modern inspection infra­
structure to facilitate an efficient flow 
of people and commercial traffic. 
Some of its provisions, such as 
advanced inspection of US-bound 
cargo and the establishment of new 
vehicular express lanes at crossing 
points for travelers categorized as a 
low security risk, were implemented 
gradually in 2003. It shows that 
administrative binational cooperation 
on the border is politically feasible, 
even under difficult political circum­
stances. If US national security poli­
cy is properly incorporated into 
requests and dialogue on regional 
requirements, an “intelligent and 
dynamic border,” in the words of 
Mexico’s Consul General in San 
Antonio, Carlos Vidali, is a viable 
outcome.
Although the US and Mexico are 
far from resolving such difficult 
issues as amnesty for undocumented 
Mexican immigrants or Mexican 
support in the United Nations for 
US Middle East policy, progress is 
certainly possible in other areas. The
political costs of Mexico’s unwilling­
ness to support the US during the 
UN deliberations on Iraq remain 
unclear, despite Colin Powell’s 
protestations that the US still views 
Mexico as a friend. Diplomatic 
efforts have overcome other scandals 
in the past. Recently, despite the dis­
covery by the Mexican press that the 
American company Choice Point 
fraudulently obtained Mexico’s voter 
registration lists on behalf of US 
intelligence agencies, Homeland 
Security Secretary Tom Ridge met 
with Mexico’s Secretary of the 
Interior, Santiago Creel, to discuss an 
undocumented immigrant amnesty 
and border regional security. Mexico 
has attempted to leverage its support 
for US national security in the bor­
der region by including the issue of 
amnesty for undocumented immi­
grants in the US. In turn, the US 
Congress has tried to link an 
amnesty to the privatization of 
Mexican oil. As these back and forth 
negotiations indicate, it is possible to 
reach agreements in some areas and 
to continue, defer or even develop 
new lines of dialogue in others.
Such a pragmatic approach is consis­
tent with the two nations’ recent 
diplomatic history.
Homeland Security, Borders and 
Emerging Globalization Trends
In an era of increased national 
security, the binational communities 
along the US-Mexico border must 
incorporate their needs and aspira­
tions into the extant rules of federal 
financial sponsorship, policies and 
regulations applicable to the region. 
Nestor Rodriguez and Jacqueline 
Hogan (2001) find that border 
regions such as El Paso/Ciudad 
Juarez and Laredo/Nuevo Laredo 
have a successful track record as 
transborder communities despite the 
national regulations that divide 
them. This strategy is increasingly 
the most viable avenue for adapting
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to the global imperatives of the new 
millennium.
Binational cooperation and region­
al integration are key mechanisms for 
addressing border issues and reduc­
ing the burden of administrative pro­
cedures designed to fortify national 
security. Officials representing bor­
der areas in both countries encourage 
such a strategy. Jeffrey Jones, a 
Mexican federal senator from a 
region of Chihuahua adjacent to the 
US border, argued eloquently in 
2002 in favor of region-based plan­
ning: “The relationship between 
Mexico and the US first occurs on 
the border. The border region must 
develop and propose solutions and 
initiatives based on its binational 
conceptualization.” New Mexico 
Governor Bill Richardson has pro­
posed that his state, Chihuahua and 
West Texas promote a synergetic 
regional agenda to better leverage 
economic development and trade, 
and San Antonio’s Consul Vidali 
calls for systemic dialogue on the 
border and its problems in the bina­
tional organizations directly con­
cerned with them, such as the 
International Water and Boundary 
Commission. Scholars too recom­
mend integrated planning for the 
development of transborder values 
and epistemologies unique to specific 
border sectors. Luis Ernesto Derbez, 
Mexico’s foreign relations secretary, 
predicts that solutions to immigra­
tion and other areas of mutual con­
cern may come in small increments 
depending on political and economic 
conditions, such as the winding
down of the war with Iraq and 
reduced national security alert levels.
Last year, the inhabitants of the 
border listened with optimism, and 
some reserve, to Tom Ridge as he 
promised representatives of the 
National Association of Counties 
that his department will safeguard 
the nation’s borders using methods, 
infrastructure and technology that 
ensure the safe and fluid movement 
of commerce and people.
Significantly, Ridge delivered this 
message at a meeting of local polities, 
the first to absorb the impact of fed­
eral policy. ■
Dennis J. Bixler-Mdrquez is director o f  
the Chicano Studies Program at the 
University o f  Texas at El Paso.
C O M I N G  S O O N
FIU Report on “Terrorism Preparedness in Florida”
Dr. Michael W. Collier, Lead Investigator
This two-year field research project by Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center 
and Institute for the Study of Transnational Crime and Terrorism investigates the readiness of Florida’s first 
responders to handle a terrorist attack. Included are an assessment of the security posture of Florida’s critical 
infrastructure and a statewide telephone poll of Florida citizens about terrorism preparedness issues.
While Florida is often seen as a national leader in emergency readiness programs and is better prepared than 
before the 9/11 disasters, the state is far from ready to respond to future attacks. The citizens surveyed for this 
project strongly supported terrorism preparedness programs, indicating they would give up more civil liberties 
and pay higher taxes to ensure the safety of their families.
To order an advance copy, call the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University, 
(305) 348-2894, or email Michael Collier at: collierm@fiu.edu.
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Dream or Deja Vu?
by Charles D. Thompson, Jr. and Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon
w .
hen President 
George W. Bush 
announced his 
plans for immi­
gration reform 
on January 7, 2004, he immediately 
ran into opposition. The president 
called for a vast guest worker pro­
gram that would legalize hundreds 
of thousands of immigrants, chiefly 
Mexican farm workers. Guest 
workers would be given three-year, 
renewable contracts with American 
employers and granted safe and 
legal passage between their homes 
and the United States; however, the 
program would withhold ordinary 
work visas, provide no path to per­
manent residency or citizenship, 
and allow undocumented workers 
in the United States to participate 
only after they paid a fine.
Criticism came without delay. 
Conservatives were skeptical of any 
immigration program that would 
give rights to and legitimate the 
past behavior of undocumented 
workers. Tom DeLay, the 
Republican House Majority leader, 
expressed “heartfelt reservations” 
about a proposal that “seems to 
reward illegal behavior.”
Progressives criticized the proposed 
program for failing to go far 
enough, for focusing on US eco­
nomic and security needs over the 
rights and welfare of the guest 
workers themselves. The 
Farmworker Justice Fund pro­
claimed that the president was 
“essentially proposing a new era of 
indentured servants,” adding that 
the US had “experimented with 
indentured servitude and ‘guest- 
worker’ programs [before]; they
“As a nation that values immigration, and
depends on immigration, we should have immigration 
laws that work and make us proud. Yet today we do 
not. Instead, we see many employers turning to the
illegal labor market . We see millions of
hard-working men and women condemned to fear and 
insecurity in a massive, undocumented 
economy. Illegal entry across our borders makes 
more difficult the urgent task of securing the home­
land. The system is not working. Our nation needs an 
immigration system that serves the American economy,
and reflects the American Dream.”
President George W. Bush 
January 7, 2004
“George Bush’s plan leaves foreign workers as
fodder for our fields and factories
without giving them a path to legalization and 
a fair shot at the American Dream.”
Senator Joseph Lieberman, D-Connecticut 
January 7, 2004
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The debate surrounding George W. Bush’s 
proposed immigration reform
failed miserably and caused great 
misery” Even Mexican President 
Vicente Fox expressed some doubt 
about the program’s ability to gain 
congressional approval before the 
next election. It became apparent 
at once that Bush would face an 
uphill battle in making any head­
way with his immigration plan.
Fifty Years of US Guest Worker 
Programs
The president’s proposal was not 
a new initiative, as he implied. In 
fact, the United States has been 
experimenting with guest worker 
programs for more than half a cen­
tury The Bracero Program of 1942 
was intended to provide replace­
ment workers for World War II sol­
diers and continued until 1964, 
bringing nearly five million 
Mexicans to the US for temporary 
farm work. The H-2 Program 
began in 1952, mainly to supply 
sugarcane workers. In 1986, as part 
of President Reagan’s Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA), 
the program was split into H-2A 
and H-2B, the former concerned 
with farm workers and the latter 
with industrial labor.
Throughout the past decade, 
there have been various efforts to 
reform or even abolish existing 
guest worker programs. Only 
months before Bush’s proposal, in 
fall 2003, legislators introduced a 
new bill called the Agricultural Job 
Opportunity, Benefits, and Security 
Act, commonly known as 
“AgJOBS.” This bipartisan bill, 
resulting from long negotiations 
between labor unions, farm organi­
zations and farm worker advocacy
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groups, had already been co-spon­
sored by 88 representatives and 50 
senators when Bush announced his 
own proposal. AgJOBS contains 
two parts. The first, a two-step 
“earned adjustment” program, 
would allow undocumented farm 
workers who had been performing 
agricultural work in the United 
States to gain temporary resident 
immigrant status and, after com­
pleting a further three to six years of 
work, permanent resident status.
The second part of the bill calls for 
the current H-2A program to be 
revised substantially, granting more 
rights and better working condi­
tions to immigrants.
The contrast between AgJOBS 
and the president’s proposal is strik­
ing. The former envisions progres­
sive steps that could lead to US citi­
zenship. The president’s proposal 
offers no such long-term initiatives. 
The reforms contained within 
AgJOBS are concerned primarily 
with farm workers’ rights, such as 
guaranteed work, fair wages and 
travel compensation. Bush’s pro­
gram emphasizes homeland security 
and the US economy.
At this writing, it is unclear if 
either of these programs will be 
adopted, or what the future holds 
for guest workers who come to the 
United States. What is clear, how­
ever, is the need to study existing 
guest worker programs before we 
adopt any further expansion plans. 
Only by interviewing and docu­
menting the lives of the workers 
themselves will it be possible to 
arrive at a just and democratic labor 
and immigration policy. Before 
proceeding further with immigra­
tion reform, we must know how 
guest workers are treated in the 
transition between their country of 
origin and the United States, what 
rights they have while they are here, 
and what communication, if any, 
they have with their own govern­
ments when they are away from 
home.
One way to find answers to these 
questions is to study existing guest 
worker programs. The largest of 
these is the H-2A Program men­
tioned above. The southeastern 
American states, especially North 
Carolina, lead the nation in hosting 
H-2A workers and are a natural 
starting point for such an examina­
tion. North Carolina receives the 
largest number of H-2A workers 
annually, currently about 24% of 
those in the program. These labor­
ers harvest a variety of crops,
including Christmas trees, cucum­
bers, sweet peppers and other veg­
etables, but the crop most responsi­
ble for the heavy influx of guest 
workers is tobacco. In 2001,
14,600 H-2A employees were work­
ing in southeastern tobacco fields, 
7,800 of them in North Carolina.
In the South, tobacco has long 
been a cash crop farmed with the 
help of landless labor—slaves at first 
and then, following abolition, 
sharecroppers, although the region 
was also home to thousands of 
small family tobacco farms. With 
time, as small farmers lost their
NSP0RTES
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The North Carolina Growers 
Association contracts with the 
Chihuahua Bus Company to trans­
p ort H-2A workers. North Carolina 
receives the most H-2A workers o f  
any state in the country.
H2-A workers at Wester Farms in 
Louisburg, North Carolina carry 
computer chips that record the num­
ber o f  buckets they pick. Here, a 
worker has his latest bucket recorded.
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tobacco acreage to large farms and 
the domestic labor force sought bet­
ter paying jobs, another source of 
workers was needed. With the US 
government’s support, southern 
tobacco farmers began to recruit 
Mexican workers. But these 
migrant laborers moved from farm 
to farm throughout the growing 
season and farmers deemed them 
unreliable. The search for a reliable 
labor pool prompted North 
Carolina tobacco interests to pursue 
a guaranteed labor supply through 
H-2A.
Much of North Carolina’s success 
in attracting H-2A workers is due 
to the North Carolina Growers’ 
Association (NCGA), an organiza­
tion started in 1989 with the sole 
purpose of matching H-2A workers 
with North Carolina farmers. To 
begin with, the NCGA had only 40 
farmer members who together 
employed 350 workers. By 1998, it 
had grown to 800 members and
7,000 workers. By 2003, the num­
ber of H-2A workers had climbed 
to 12,000. Farmers favor H-2A 
workers because of their reliabili­
ty—they are bused from Mexico to 
individual farms where they remain 
for the entire season. Also, farmers 
pay no Social Security or other taxes 
on H-2A wages. By far the greatest 
advantage of the H-2A workers, 
however, is the farmer’s ability to 
control the flow of labor in and out 
of the farm.
In his January 2004 speech, 
President Bush insisted that any 
immigration reform must reflect the 
American Dream. Yet with the 
notable exception of bringing 
undocumented workers into the 
program, his proposal differs little 
from the present H-2A system.
This raises an important question 
that only further fieldwork can 
answer: Does the H-2A program 
reflect the American Dream, or is it 
merely a continuation of the same
H-2A workers on their way to North 
Carolina at a lunch stop in Houston, 
Texas.
The trip to the United States costs 
some H-2A workers as much as 
$1500 o f  their own money fo r  trans­
portation and fees  collected by 
Mexican “coyotes. ”
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Picking cucumbers. H-2A workers are bused to individual farm s where they remain fo r  the entire season.
policies the US has followed for 
more than 50 years?
Strengths and Weaknesses of 
Guest Worker Programs
To seek an answer to this ques­
tion, among others, Cynthia Hill 
and Charles D. Thompson, Jr. (co­
author of this article) have pro­
duced a documentary film entitled 
“The Guestworker: Bienvenidos a 
Carolina del Norte (Welcome to 
North Carolina).” For this project, 
they followed H-2A workers from 
their arrival on a North Carolina 
farm in June 2002 to their return 
home to Mexico in November of 
the same year and continued docu­
menting them the following year. 
Hill and Thompson focused on a
single household of workers, on one 
particular farm, as representative of 
the larger contingent of H-2A 
workers in the United States. The 
film is narrated by one of the work­
ers, Candelario Gonzalez Moreno.
“The Guestworker” allows H-2A 
workers to speak for themselves and 
shows the reality of life on one 
North Carolina farm. It documents 
all aspects of the H-2A worker’s life, 
from grocery shopping and cooking 
to the long days spent in the fields. 
Many of the workers are grateful for 
the safety of the H-2A program, 
particularly the older workers who 
can no longer risk the arduous path 
of illegal border crossings. Most are 
glad to have a written work contract 
to protect them.
The H-2A program also has nega­
tive aspects, however. In interviews, 
dozens of the H-2A workers in Hill 
and Thompson’s film longed for 
rights that are currently denied 
them. These include greater job 
security and the freedom to live 
with their families year-round in the 
United States. H-2A provides no 
retirement or Social Security bene­
fits, and without any hope of citi­
zenship, rights to collective bargain­
ing are curtailed. Much of the 
enforcement of contracts is left up 
to the NCGA, a private organiza­
tion essentially owned by farmer 
members.
Workers are also fearful of what 
they call the “lista negra,” or black 
list. This is a list controlled by
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growers that contains the names of 
workers eligible for continued 
employment in future years. If a 
worker leaves before the end of the 
growing season, even because of ill­
ness, he is forbidden to return for 
three years. After the three years are 
up, he is placed at the bottom of 
the list, making it unlikely that he 
will get a return spot.
There are further downsides to 
the H-2A program. The trip to the 
United States costs some H-2A 
workers as much as $1,500 of their 
own funds for transportation and 
fees collected by Mexican 
“recruiters,” otherwise known as 
“coyotes.” While employers reim­
burse much of this fronted money 
by the end of the season in 
November, before that time workers 
often pay exorbitant interest rates 
on borrowed funds. This debt 
effectively keeps them on the farms, 
even if the work is not to their lik­
ing or they are abused.
Compare these conditions with 
those described by President Bush 
in his description of the American 
Dream for immigrants. He speaks 
of a “welcoming society” that has 
encouraged the “hard work and the 
faith and the entrepreneurial spirit 
of immigrants” to flourish. Current 
guest worker programs, the presi­
dent claims, have allowed “the tal­
ents and dreams of the world” to be 
used to benefit the United States. 
Many immigrants, he says, staying 
true to the American Dream, have 
taken the “familiar path from hired 
labor to ownership.” Are such con­
cepts compatible with the current 
structure of the H-2A program? 
Existing fieldwork suggests they are 
not, although much work remains 
to be done before we can reach a 
firm conclusion. What can be said 
with certainty, though, is that for 
any new guest worker proposal to 
bring immigrants closer to the 
American Dream, the current sys-
Mexican H-2A workers making the jou rney to North Carolina study a map to 
fam iliarize themselves with their destination.
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H-2A workers waiting outside NCGA 
headquarters in Vass, North Carolina.
tern of im migration must be care­
fully studied and the mistakes o f the 
past must be avoided. ■
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“Terrorism and Political Violence, ” 
and “Peace and Change. ”
The authors would like to acknowl­
edge and thank Anna Bauer, Carey 
Dawn Lowe and Caitlin Beer fo r  
their invaluable research assistance. Candelario Gonzdlez Moreno, a Mexican H-2A worker and the subject o f  a doc­
umentary film  on guest workers in North Carolina.
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Is Mexico Too Difficult to Bear?
by Juan Carlos Gamboa
The U.S. and Mexico: The Bear 
and the Porcupine
By Jeffrey Davidow 
Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener 
Publishers, 2003, 254 pages.
$69.95 hardcover; $24.95 paper­
back.
Easy to read and packed with 
delightful anecdotes, The Bear and  
the Porcupine is an informal mem­
oir of Jeffrey Davidow’s four-year 
tenure (1998-2002) as US ambassa­
dor to Mexico. The book features 
his recollections of some of the 
most important political events in 
Mexico’s recent history: the election 
of Vicente Fox as president and the 
consolidation of the country’s dem­
ocratic transition after more than 
70 years of semi-authoritarian rule 
under the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI).
The book’s title refers to the his­
torical relationship between the 
sometimes admiring and always 
prickly Mexican “porcupine” and 
the usually well-intended but often 
insensitive American “bear.” 
Davidow offers readers a first-hand 
account of the many misunder­
standings that make it difficult to 
achieve improved cooperation 
between the two countries.
The analysis is spiced with a 
healthy dose of gossip about influ­
ential Mexican and US political 
personalities. On the Mexican side, 
former Foreign Minister Jorge 
Castaneda comes off as impulsive 
and undisciplined, while on the US 
side, Ari Fleischer and Madelaine 
Albright are portrayed as an arro­
gant brat and a prima donna, 
respectively.
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But nothing seems to amuse 
Davidow more than the maneuvers 
of Mexican politicians during an 
electoral season. “I enjoy the com­
pany of politicians in campaign,” 
he writes. “Like dogs in heat, there 
is a simplicity and transparency to 
their objectives. Observing 
Mexican politicians is doubly fun 
because they truly enjoy backstab- 
bing and gossiping, two of the 
world’s great spectator sports.”
Also enjoyable are Davidow’s 
anecdotes about visitors to the 
Mexican Embassy from “Planet 
Washington.” In his view, unin­
formed and pushy American offi­
cials don’t mix well with oversensi­
tive Mexicans who seem convinced 
that the White House spends much 
of its time plotting ways to under­
mine Mexico’s sovereignty.
Davidow illustrates such sensitivi­
ties with anecdotes of his daily 
interactions with members of the 
Mexican press, whose questions 
were invariably variations on the 
theme, “How are you planning to 
violate our sovereignty today, Mr. 
Ambassador?”
But The Bear and the Porcupine is 
much more than political gossip 
and entertainment. It provides 
readers with a keen analysis of some 
of the issues that have defined the 
nature of US-Mexico bilateral rela­
tions in the past few years. Among 
the book’s many contributions is 
Davidow’s fascinating insider 
account of the failed attempt by 
President Fox to reach a compre­
hensive agreement on immigration 
with the United States. In the 
ambassador’s view, Fox’s failure had 
less to do with the change in 
American priorities after September
11 than with Mexico’s pushiness 
and misreading of US political real­
ity
Davidow also offers an insightful 
interpretation of one of the most 
contentious issues facing the neigh­
boring countries: drug trafficking. 
His discussion includes a thought­
ful assessment of the detrimental 
effect of the so-called “certification” 
process. Every year, until the law 
was revised in 2002, the US 
Congress required the president to 
certify countries’ cooperation with 
US anti-narcotics programs. 
Countries that were not certified 
risked losing US foreign aid. In 
practical terms, Mexico’s certifica­
tion as an ally in the war against 
drugs was little more than an 
empty threat. A decision not to 
certify Mexico would have present­
ed the US with a security, immigra­
tion and trade problem that the 
country could not afford. And in 
any case, Mexico receives little 
financial help from the United 
States. Nevertheless, Mexico cares 
deeply about its international image 
and resented the humiliating annu­
al ritual. Says Davidow: “The most 
negative effect of the certification 
law was that for years it focused 
Mexican attention on an extraneous 
issue—the perceived American 
arrogance inherent in the process of 
judging others—and, in doing so, 
provided a pretext for Mexico to 
ignore the reality of its drug scene.” 
While pointing out some of the 
many misunderstandings that per­
meate the bilateral relationship, 
Davidow also underscores initia­
tives that have helped strengthen 
constructive communication 
between the two neighbors. In par­
ticular, he credits the annual meet­
ings of the Binational Commission, 
which bring together cabinet mem­
bers from both countries and pro­
vide them with the opportunity to 
bond with their foreign counter­
parts. Perhaps even more impor­
tant, under pressure to show “deliv­
erables,” the meetings often force 
the two bureaucracies to create aca­
demic exchange programs, informa­
tion-sharing systems, and innumer­
able other tangible products that 
effectively reinforce US-Mexican 
relations year after year.
The ambassador is a firm believer 
that a greater level of convergence 
between the two countries is 
inevitable. In this vein, he con­
cludes the book by envisioning the 
potential for a common currency, 
open borders and even a North 
American parliament. Davidow is 
anything but naive and recognizes 
the political hurdles these proposals 
entail. But instead of discarding 
them outright, he suggests concrete 
initiatives to promote increased 
integration: a customs union with 
common external tariffs; a joint leg­
islative commission to hold hear­
ings and legislate separately on 
common issues; and increasing the 
number of Mexican guest workers 
allowed into the United States.
Whether or not Davidow’s vision 
becomes a reality or remains a pipe 
dream, he has already contributed 
to an improved understanding of 
the United States’ relationship with 
its southern neighbor. His first­
hand account of the dynamics and 
issues that complicate the interac­
tion between the two countries is 
difficult to find in academic vol­
umes, and he presents his experi­
ences with a candor that readers on 
both sides of the border will find 
invaluable. Add the gossip and it 
makes for a very enjoyable read. ■
Juan Carlos Gamboa, PhD is a sen­
ior vice president fo r  governm ent 
affairs at the M iami office o f  
Fleishman-Hillard, an international 
communications firm .
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US-Latin American Relations
by M arian Goslinga
T he United States has a long history of involvement in and with Latin America. The relationship has varied from intense adulation to 
benign neglect—as dictated by US 
interests. Although at present the 
US has its attention focused else­
where in the world, events and 
issues in Latin America remain a 
matter of ongoing concern.
For a chronology of the 55 US 
interventions in Latin America 
since 1890, see http://www2.tru- 
man.edu/ "marc/ resources/interven- 
tions.html, a website maintained by 
Truman State University. The bib­
liography that follows deals with 
some of these events, as well as 
other aspects of a relationship that 
has veered between prickliness and 
affinity.
Castaneda, Jorge G. “NAFTA at 
10: A Plus or a Minus?” Current 
History, vol. 103 (February 2004): 
51-55. (On the tenth anniversary 
of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, the author summarizes 
the major benefits and problems 
that Mexico has accrued from closer 
integration with the United States.)
Christman, Daniel W., and John G. 
Heimann (eds.). Andes 2020: A 
New Strategy fo r the Challenges 
o f Colombia and the Region.
New York, N.Y.: Council on 
Foreign Relations (Distributed by 
the Brookings Institution Press), 
2004. 134 pp. (Report of an inde­
pendent commission sponsored by 
the Council on Foreign Relations’ 
Center for Preventive Action.)
Cooper, Andrew F. “The Making 
of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter: A Case of Complex 
Multilateralism.” International 
Studies Perspective 5, no. 1 
(February 2004): 92-113. (Dis­
cusses US—Latin American relations 
within the framework of the 
Organization of American States.)
Corbin, Heather. “The Proposed 
United States-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement: Reconciling Free Trade 
and Environmental Protection.”
Colorado Journal o f  International 
Environmental Law and Policy 15, 
no. 1 (Winter 2003): 119-142.
Davidow, Jeffrey. The U.S. and 
Mexico: The Bear and the 
Porcupine. Princeton, N.J.:
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2004. 
(Reviewed in this issue.)
Dobbins, James. A Fresh Start fo r 
Haiti: Charting Future U.S. 
Haitian Relations [Electronic 
Resource]. Santa Monica, Calif.: 
RAND, 2004. (Available on the 
Web at http://www.rand.org/ 
publications/CT / CT219/CT219. 
pdf.)
Feeley, John. Invest More, Expect 
Less: The Hard Truth about U.S. 
Policy in Colombia. Washington, 
D.C.: National War College, 2004. 
14 pp. (Available on the Web at 
http://www.ndu.edu/library/n4/n04 
5601o.pdf.)
Foreign Policy Association and the 
State University of New York, Neil 
D. Levin Graduate Institute of 
International Relations. Great
Decisions 2004  [Video Recording]. 
New York, N.Y.: Foreign Policy 
Association, 2004. 2 videocassettes 
(216 min.) (Tape 2 features Latin 
America: The Price o f  Neglect by 
Bernard Aronson and Joy Olson.)
Frankel, Max. High Noon in the 
Cold War: Kennedy, Krushchev, 
and the Missile Crisis. New York, 
N.Y.: Ballantine Books, 2004.
Friedman, Max Paul. “Retiring the 
Puppets: Bringing Latin America 
Back in Recent Scholarship on 
United States-Latin American 
Relations.” Diplomatic History 27, 
no. 5 (November 2003): 621-636.
Girard, Philippe R. Clinton in 
Haiti: The 1994 U.S. Intervention 
in Haiti. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004.
Griffith, Ivelaw L. Caribbean 
Security in the Age o f Terror: 
Challenge and Change. Kingston, 
Jamaica: Ian Randle, 2004. 552 pp.
Hallward, P. “Option Zero in 
Haiti.” New Left Review, no. 27 
(2004): 23-48.
Harbour, Frances V. “Moral 
Agency and Moral Responsibility 
in Humanitarian Intervention.”
Global Society 18, no. 1. (January
2004): 61-75. (Discusses six recent 
case studies, including Haiti.)
Heron, Tony. The New Political 
Economy o f United States- 
Caribbean Relations: The Apparel 
Industry and the Politics o f 
NAFTA Parity. Aldershot,
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England; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 
2004. 155 pp. (Published in the 
series “International Political 
Economy of New Regionals.”)
Hirst, Monica. The United States 
and Brazil: A Long Road o f  
Unmet Expectations. London; 
New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2004.
Jackson, Robert J. North American 
Politics: Canada, USA, and Mexico 
in Comparative Perspective.
Toronto, Canada: Pearson/Prentice 
Hall, 2004. 262 pp.
Kirk, Robin. More Terrible than 
Death: Massacres, Drugs, and  
America’s War in Colombia. Pbk
ed. with a new epilogue. New York, 
N.Y.: Public Affairs, 2004. 317 pp.
LaRosa, Michael and German 
Mejia P. The United States 
Discovers Panama: The Writings 
o f  Soldiers, Scholars, and  
Scoundrels, 1850-1905■ Lanham, 
Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 
311 pp.
Longley, Kyle. In the Eagle’s 
Shadow: the United States and  
Latin America [Sound Recording]. 
Princeton, N.J.: Recording for the 
Blind & Dyslexic, 2004. 1 sound 
disc.
Maingot, Anthony P. and Wilfredo 
Lozano. The United States and  
the Caribbean: Transforming 
Hegemony and Sovereignty. New
York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2004.
Mainwaring, Max C. Hemispheric 
Strategic Objectives fo r  the Next 
Decade. Carlyle Barracks, Penn.: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 2004. 4 pp.
----------Security in the Americas:
Neither Evolution nor 
Devolution-Impasse. Carlyle
Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
2004. 38 pp.
Mignolo, Walter. The Idea o f  
Latin America. Oxford, England: 
Blackwell, 2004. 176 pp.
Murillo, Mario A., and Jesus Rey 
Avirama. Colombia and the 
United States: War, Unrest, and  
Destabilization. New York, N.Y.: 
Seven Stories; London:
Turnaround, 2004. 232 pp.
Poole, Lynn, et al. Remember the 
Maine and to Hell with Spain
[Videorecording]. Baltimore, Md: 
Johns Hopkins University, 2004. 1 
videocassette (28 minutes). (Events 
and personalities of the 1898 U.S. 
Intervention in Cuba.)
Raat, Dirk W. Mexico and the 
United States. 3rd ed. Athens,
Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 
2004. 296 pp.
Randall, Stephen J. “The Tragedy 
of American Diplomacy Revisited: 
U.S. Relations with Latin America 
and the Caribbean.” Latin 
American Research Review 38, no. 2 
(2003): 167-179.
Shaw, Carolyn M. Cooperation, 
Conflict, and Consensus in the 
Organization o f  American States. 
New York, N.Y.: Houndmills,
2004. 209 pp.
Shifter, Michael. “The U.S. and 
Latin America Through the Lens 
of Empire.” Current History, vol. 
103 (February 2004): 61-67.
Tavidze, Albert (ed.). Andean 
Regional Initiative. New York. 
N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers,
2004. 163 pp.
Truett, Samuel, and Elliott Young 
(eds.). Continental Crossroads: 
Remapping U.S.-Mexico 
Borderlands History. Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004.
United States Congress, Senate 
Caucus on International Narcotics 
Control. U.S. Policy Regarding 
Narcotics Control in Colombia. 
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004.
85 pp. (Hearing before the caucus 
on International Narcotics Control, 
108th Congress, first session, June 
3, 2003.)
United States Congress, House 
Committee on International 
Relations, Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere. Challenges 
and Opportunities fo r  U.S. Policy 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004.
68 pp. (Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere of the Committee on 
International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 108th Congress, 
first session, October 21, 2003.)
United States Congress, Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. 
Challenges and Successes fo r  U.S. 
Policy toward Colombia: Is Plan 
Colombia Working? Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 2004. 92 pp.
(Hearing before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 108th Congress, 
first session, October 23, 2003.)
Marian Goslinga is the Latin 
American and Caribbean bibliogra­
ph er a t Florida International 
University.
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Ta b l e  3 :  P e r  C a p it a  G D P , I n c o m e  D is t r ib u t io n , P e r  C a p it a  R e m it t a n c e s , a n d  A v e r a g e  H o u s e h o l d  
R e m it t a n c e s  (US$)
Country
Annual per 
capita GDP 
(2002)
GDP per 
capita of 
poorest 20% 
(2002)
GDP per 
capita of 
poorest 40% 
(2002)
Remittances 
per capita 
(2002)
Average annual 
remittances 
received by 
recipient 
households
Dominican Republic 2,080 530 480 230 1,590
El Salvador 2,080 300 350 230 2,300
Costa Rica 4,100 n/a n/a n/a 2,800
Guatemala 1,750 340 400 140 2,150
Honduras 920 90 130 110 2,060
Mexico 3,740 770 890 100 3,020
Nicaragua 470 50 80 130 1,170
Source: Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on Remittances (2004).
crucial social safety net, as the Inter- 
American Dialogue task force noted: 
“In Honduras, Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, and a few other of Latin 
Americas poorest nations, remit­
tances may be more than doubling 
the incomes of the poorest 20 per­
cent of the population.”
Remittances are essential to the qual­
ity of life of the poor and even the 
middle class, and they relieve 
demands and pressures on govern­
ment social services (see Table 3).
As North and Central America 
and the Dominican Republic inte­
grate economically and converge 
under CAFTA, dependence on the 
United States will increase, as will 
the asymmetry in their relations. 
That is, Central America and the 
Dominican Republic will remain rel­
atively unimportant to the average 
American as the United States 
becomes even more important to 
Central Americans and Dominicans.
Except for trade and immigration 
issues, US foreign policy towards the 
region since the end of the Cold War 
has been an “afterthought.” The 
Central American countries barely 
register as blips on Washingtons 
radar screen; in contrast, the United 
States is domestic politics in Central 
America. One need only compare 
the massive architecture of US 
embassy buildings in the region with 
the government buildings of the host 
countries.
In sum, while the redefinition of 
national and international security 
partly explains the Central American 
and Dominican governments’ sup­
port of the US-led invasion of Iraq, 
the real reasons lie in the feared costs 
of challenging the United States at a 
sensitive time. The dominant 
neoliberal elites of these countries 
simply could not, and cannot, jeop­
ardize their increasingly beneficial 
political and economic relationships
with the United States. Their gov­
ernments supported the United 
States in Iraq primarily out of prag­
matic considerations of dependent 
vulnerability and feared retribution. 
To close with Stanley Kubrick’s anal­
ogy, these small nations, like prosti­
tutes, are consummate pragmatists. 
They have to be. ■
Vincent T. Gawronski is an assistant 
professor ofpolitica l science and politi­
cal science coordinator in the Division 
o f  Behavioral and Social Sciences at 
Birmingham-Southern College, 
Birmingham, Alabama. A longer ver­
sion o f  this paper was presented at the 
Midwest Political Science Association
2004 Conference in Chicago, Illinois.
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